At First Sight: Russian Armor/Mechanized
Battalion Tactical Groups in Ukraine War
by MAJ Gonzalo Báez
The Russian battalion tactical group (BTG) was born of the “New Look” military reforms that began in
2007. The Russian army’s transition undoubtedly reflected its experience in the Chechnya War (1994-
2000).
In that asymmetric war in the Caucasus region, brigades and divisions proved to be oversized, slow-
reacting units with obsolete equipment, antiquated tactics and an inability to combine their weapons
with the speed that modern combat demands.
1
Those large organizations were conceived by the
previous Soviet army system at the beginning of the Cold War to fight against the armored and
mechanized forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
During the Battle of Grozny (December 1994-March 1995), with their doctrine outmoded and rusty,
Russian armored and mechanized forces were initially repulsed in that capital city. They suffered heavy
casualties and were forced into an operational pause. Among other things, Russian troops lacked
combat readiness, and they were surprised by the unexpected resistance of the Chechens, who forced
two long months of heavy fighting.
Only after suffering heavy losses, the Russian army decided to change its tactics to oppose the Chechen
special groups that combined anti-tank weapons, boobytraps, snipers and machinegun crews from
almost every building. At that time, after losing around 225 armored vehicles (including 62 tanks) and
more than 1,500 soldiers, the Russians unleashed the largest air and land attack since World War II in
Grozny, producing 1,370 casualties among Chechen soldiers, with about 27,000 civilians killed.
2
From that raw experience, according to a U.S. Army publication,
3
profound doctrinal changes were
made to the Russian army, including reorganization and modernization of its forces in general. In
addition to conflicts in the satellite countries, the Russian army took note of the lessons-learned by the
United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, the BTG concept was created in search of a new kind
of organization with more expeditionary capacities to project forces based on new technologies.
Moreover, other experts and defense Internet sites
4, 5, 6
indicate that Russia seeks to replace the old
model of massive, rigid and pure organizations the Soviet army had, explaining that regiments and
battalions are ideal for maintaining the army during peace, especially in its daily tasks. However, to have
real capabilities for combat, more flexible and autonomous organizations are needed to face a modern
enemy in the multidomain spectrum.
The new organization was put to the test in 2008 with the first BTG deployed on the border with the
Republic of Georgia, using a special formation under Russian Army Command No. 58. The direct
dependency on such a command was atypical, since the normal way would have been to operate at
brigade level. Soon a second type of BTG was formed with light materiel for air-assault operations and
high-readiness strategic mobility to anticipate and occupy key terrain that favored Russia.
7
The BTG represents a departure from the Soviet model, giving more importance to the quality of
technology than to quantity of equipment. However, this latest concept is strongly questioned after
analyzing the current 2022 campaign in Ukraine. Russia currently has more than 60 brigades or similar
formations organized, mostly with two BTGs each.
8
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu has said that
by August 2021 there were 168 BTGs in the Russian armed forces, indicating that this type of
organization was the standard and perhaps the main change in Russian land doctrine.
9
Aware of their shortcomings in conventional weapon systems, the Russians sought greater
independence at the tactical-unit level, covering with artillery what they didn’t get from aviation.
(Aviation is more expensive, very complex to coordinate and synchronize with land maneuver.)
In short, the BTG concept was conceived as a combined-arms unit, capable of rapid deployment to deter
and react quickly to crisis situations on the multidomain modern battlefield. To that end, the BTG
combines the power of Russia’s armored forces with its artillery massed fires, antitank weapons
