Introduction
Every US National Defense Strategy (NDS) must grapple with fundamen-
tal trade-os to address the myriad security threats facing the United
States and its allies and partners. As the Biden administration prepares
to launch the next NDS in early 2022, it is evident that this key document
will emphasize strategic competition with China, following the trajectory
of the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), the 2018 NDS, and the 2021
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.
1
Given “strategic simultane-
ity” among numerous geopolitical and nontraditional threats, including
China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, violent extremists, pandemics, and cli-
mate change, prioritizing China as the pacing threat is certainly necessary
to guide key Department of Defense (DoD) imperatives for force modern-
ization, resource allocation, and alliance coordination.
2
1 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017,
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.
pdf; Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United
States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, January 2018, https://
dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf;
and the White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
2 In their 2021 Atlantic Council report, Seizing the Advantage: A Vision for the Next US
National Defense Strategy, the authors define “strategic simultaneity” as the phenomenon
of confronting multiple major threats at the same time. In particular, “In a world of intensifying
multipolarity among more advanced state and non-state actors, the United States may still be
the strongest power by many metrics, but it cannot overwhelm every threat simultaneously.”
Consequently, addressing this challenge “requires realistic assessments of critical national and
allied interests, the actors and trends that threaten them, and the opportunities for countering
them.” For more on this issue, see Clementine G. Starling, Lt Col Tyson K. Wetzel, and Christian
S. Trotti, Seizing the Advantage: A Vision for the Next US National Defense Strategy, Atlantic
Council, December 2021, 25, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/
Seizing-the-Advantage_A-Vision-for-the-Next-US-National-Defense-Strategy.pdf.
The Next
National Defense
Strategy Must
Get Russia Right
ISSUE BRIEF
The Scowcroft Center for Strategy
and Security works to develop
sustainable, nonpartisan strategies
to address the most important
security challenges facing the
United States and its allies and
partners. The Center honors the
legacy of service of General Brent
Scowcroft and embodies his ethos
of nonpartisan commitment to the
cause of security, support for US
leadership in cooperation with
allies and partners, and dedication
to the mentorship of the next
generation of leaders.
Forward Defense (FD) shapes the
debate around the greatest defense
challenges facing the United States
and its allies, and creates forward-
looking assessments of the trends,
technologies, and concepts that
will define the future of warfare.
Through the futures we forecast,
the scenarios we wargame, and
the analyses we produce, FD
develops actionable strategies to
help the United States navigate
major-power conflict and defend
forward, alongside allies and
partners. As the character of war
rapidly changes, FD assesses the
operational concepts and defense-
industrial tools necessary to
eectively deter and defend against
emerging military challenges.
Opinions, conclusions, and
recommendations expressed or
implied within are solely those of
the authors and do not necessarily
represent the views of the US
Department of Defense, the
Air Force, the Army, the Marine
Corps, the Navy, or any other US
government agency.
CLEMENTINE G. STARLING, CHRISTIAN S. TROTTI,
and LT COL TYSON K. WETZEL
FEBRUARY 2022
