Protective Construction for Personnel in Operations Buildings with Varying Explosives Hazards
John Nevels, PE; US Army Corps of Engineers; Huntsville, AL, USA
Keywords: protective construction, concurrent operations, operational scenarios, existing construction, internal
detonations, control room
Abstract: Due to limited land available for operations involving explosives and the need for relative ease of access
for operators, personnel protection must often be provided through protective construction in accordance with UFC
3-340-02. Some facilities, particularly in the research and development field, present complexities in protective design
due to operations involving varying hazard levels, explosive weights, and hazard divisions. Architectural features
such as common corridors and user requirements such as operational flexibility serve to further complicate explosives
safety compliance.
This paper and presentation discuss a method of demonstrating that a facility meets the personnel protection
requirements of DoD 6055.09-M through a combination of administrative controls, blast effects modeling, and
structural analysis. Different levels of operational hazards, varying explosive weight requirements, and flexibility to
conduct hazardous operations with both Hazard Division (HD) 1.1 and HD 1.3 material are addressed through
operational scenarios which individually restrict explosives operations, but which, when applied as needed, allow for
both flexibility desired by the user and the ability to discretely analyze each hazard using the methods of UFC 3-340-
02 to ensure the appropriate level of protection for personnel within the building during such operations.
Introduction
Over the years, misunderstanding and frustration with existing explosives safety criteria and requirements have
resulted in many installations within the Department of Defense (DoD) seeking command acceptance of risks
associated with explosives operations rather than obtaining formal approval from their respective Service explosives
safety agencies and the Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB). Such risk acceptance is generally
considered temporary, requiring periodic command review to either ensure that steps are being taken to bring such a
non-compliant facility into compliance with DoD and service-level criteria or renew and update appropriate command
levels of the risks being accepted. At times, service, agency, or command approaches and philosophies can change,
resulting in leadership being less willing to perpetually accept a level of explosives safety risk beyond that of DoD
6055.09-M
1
, and subsequently requiring a facility which has been operating under a risk acceptance to be brought into
compliance with the criteria either through retrofit efforts or through operational controls and modifications.
This paper provides an example of such a building and its associated service magazine that were constructed without
formal DDESB approval and which were expected to operate under command risk acceptance. After construction
completion, leadership decided not to accept excessive risk, and the buildings were required to comply with DoD and
service-level explosives safety criteria. The example operations building is a research and development (R&D) facility
that houses operations with varying hazard levels, operations involving materials from different hazard divisions, and
operations originally performed in separate facilities being brought together under one roof. Methods are provided
for demonstrating the analytical methods and operational controls that are required to bring the facility into compliance
while retaining functional and efficient operational capability.
Analysis Approach
DoD 6055.09-M states that “Protective construction, such as hardening an ES or constructing a PES to suppress
explosion effects to provide an appropriate degree of protection, may allow a reduction of the separation distances
required by quantity-distance (QD) tables.” Two general methods are available for demonstrating the amount of
protection afforded through hardened construction: analysis and testing. Since the analytical approach is used in this
instance, the methods of Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 3-340-02
2
and HNDED-CS-93-7 (Rev 1)
3
are utilized.
Structural and architectural drawings are available, along with descriptions of three operational scenarios that enable
these analysis methods to be appropriately applied. Since this information is available, analysis can be used to
demonstrate the protective capabilities of the building for the operational scenarios provided, as well as for the above
ground storage magazine servicing the building. As per DDESB guidance and the requirements of DoD 6055.09-M,
