1
No. – 2 – 2020
Chinese Intransigence in Ladakh:
An Overview
USI Occasional Paper
Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation (CS3)
Major General PK Mallick, VSM (Retd)
Introduction
China and India are heirs to the two oldest
civilisations of the world. Both emerged in their
present form after World War II. India became
independent in 1947 and the People’s Republic of
China was founded in 1949. ey share one of the
world’s longest borders, about 3488 kms, across
the Himalayas. Both are nuclear weapon states.
China’s missiles can reach anywhere in the world.
India’s latest Agni series missiles can reach Beijing
comfortably. On border issues there have been
instances where the security forces were facing
each other in contested areas and were increasingly
indulging in stght, pushing and shoving etc
in very dicult terrains. On Jun 15 this year in
a brutal, savage skirmish when, sts, rocks, rods,
baton, spikes, knuckle-dusters and nail-studded
clubs and wooden clubswrapped in barbed wire
were used in a post at Galwan on Indian side of
Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh sector
at an altitude of 4,250 meters. is type of battle
used to be fought in medieval times. Armies ght
with bayonets and close quarter battles in extreme
situations when all other means of ghting ends.
By all means, this incidence of Jun 15 is a watershed
event and a game-changer in China-India
relations. Even if China realises its blunder and the
dangerous consequences and exercises restraint,
the damage has been done. It may not be possible
to return to the status quo ante for a long time.
India, after this, cannot trust China and all the
condence-building measures. India has to think
big and change its foreign policy, grand strategy,
military strategy and force structuring, deterrence,
nuclear and economic policies et al. e incident
on Jun 15 has raised a lot of questions. Why did
China do this when ‘he’ is under tremendous
pressure in all fronts, it this China’s salami slice
tactics being progressed rigorously, what will be the
new rules of Engagement, what will be escalatory
control mechanism, who has taken this decision,
will there be some pressure put by China in India’s
North-East through insurgency especially by some
Naga rebels who are already in China for training,
what are India’s options? ese questions need
deliberations.
e Roads of War
China began construction of National Highway
G219, the Sky Road, in 1951 connecting
southwestern Xinjiang to the western extremity
of Tibet. is highway links China’s two ultra-
sensitive “ethnic frontiers”: Buddhist-majority
Tibet and Muslim-majority Xinjiang. is
highway passes through Aksai Chin historically
part of India, for over 160 kms. Director of the
Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT), M. Taylor Fravel
said, “China is very sensitive to Indian activity in
the western sector and it goes back to the reasons
why it decided to ght in 1962 — to defend that
road that connected Xinjiang to Tibet.
India has constructed the 255 km Shyok road,
known as the Darbuk–Shyok–Daulat Beg Oldi
road (DSDBO) which was completed in 2019.
is road connects India’s Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO)
aireld. At 5,065 meters, the world’s highest
aireld is very close to the Karakoram Highway
linking China and Pakistan. Indian transport
connectivity to DBO shrinks China’s logistical
superiority in this tough terrain. In this type of
mountainous terrain, there are very limited places
like passes, gaps, axes and laterals and river valleys
like Chip Chap/Galwan/Cheng Chenmo/ Indus
through which movement of troops and in some
cases armoured vehicles can take place. China is
