An Institute of Land Warfare Publication
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original essays on topics that will stimulate professional discussion and further public understanding of the landpower aspects
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Constructive Engagement:
A Proven Method for Conducting
Stability and Support Operations
by
Martin Rodriguez, Andrew Farnsler and John Bott
In the Iraqi theater of operations (ITO), successful conduct of stability and support
operations (SASO) requires an imaginative combination of lethal and nonlethal methods. For
the U.S. Army’s 1st Cavalry Division, the combination is known as constructive engagement
(CE) and is conducted in battalion sectors throughout Baghdad.
1
CE combines the full
spectrum of military operations with diplomacy at the tactical level, a strategy described by
top commanders in Iraq in a 2004 New York Times article as “a mix of military tactics, political
maneuverings, media management and a generous dollop of cash for quickly rebuilding war-
ravaged cities—a formula that, if it survives the test of time, could become a model for future
fighting against the persistent insurrections plaguing Iraq.”
2
During full-spectrum operations in a SASO environment, a commander must balance
the application of military (lethal and civil-military) operations with diplomatic engagement
to achieve the desired endstate. CE describes the methods commanders use to reach this
balance, and in Baghdad the goal is the creation of a safe and secure environment in which
the seeds of a republic will flourish. The mix of military and diplomatic tactics required very
much depends on the environment within each unit sector and the personality of the battalion
commander; a commander’s skill as a Soldier and diplomat often determine the unit’s level of
success. Many small-unit leaders and commanders in Baghdad found diplomatic methods are
often the most efficient means of reducing the insurgent base. Operations research analysts
measured the effects of this approach through analysis of the changes in the types and number
of enemy attacks in sectors across Baghdad. Statistical comparison of attacks before and after
engagement operations began demonstrated the decisive operation type in Baghdad’s SASO
environment is nonlethal. Commanders used military operations to shape the environment
but used CE to achieve success.
Landpower Essay
An Institute of Land Warfare Publication
