CHAPTER 10
The Need for Influence Theory and
Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries
∗
Alexander L. George
This analysis begins with a discussion of problems of employing
deterrence and coercive diplomacy in intra-state conflicts, drawing on those
aspects of experience with these strategies during the Cold War relevant for
dealing with intra-state conflicts, and adding some reflections on problems
of employing these strategies in the post-Cold War environment.
The special characteristics of intra-state conflicts, identified in this
analysis, call attention to the need for several types of indirect deterrence
and coercive diplomacy. Emphasis is placed on including deterrence and
coercive diplomacy within a broader influence framework that considers
the utility and sometimes the necessity for coupling these strategies with
positive initiatives.
Influence theory also requires that consideration be given to the role
of reassurances to adversaries under several well-defined circumstances.
An influence framework must also consider the possible utility of a
strategy of conciliation (a term preferable to the discredited concept of
appeasement). Similarly, the concept of influence theory also includes the
strategy of conditional reciprocity, which limits risks of conciliatory
efforts and which, also, can be employed in pursuing the ambitious long-
range objective of re-socializing “rogue” leaders and “outlaw” states.
Attention is given in this analysis also to the problem of dealing with
“spoilers” in intra-state conflicts, those who complicate or attempt to
defeat efforts by mediators to end such struggles. The efforts of mediators
will be facilitated if they distinguish between different types of spoilers
∗
Helpful comments on an earlier draft were provided by Barry Schneider and Brad Roberts.
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