俄罗斯进攻性战役评估,2023年3月27日

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 27, 2023
Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan
March 27, 7:15pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that
ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse
map archive monthly.
Rumors about the dismissal of Russian Eastern Group of Forces (Eastern Military
District) Commander Colonel General Rustam Muradov on March 27 generated a
muted and cynical response in the Russian information space. The milbloggers claimed that
Russian military authorities dismissed Muradov from his position as Eastern Group of Forces
commander, but ISW cannot currently verify these claims.[1] Muradov took command of the Russian
Eastern Military District (EMD) on October 6, 2022, and has overseen a series of disastrous offensive
operations led by EMD elements in western Donetsk Oblast over the past five months.[2] One
milblogger claimed that Muradov is on “vacation,” which the milblogger noted is tantamount to
resignation. Others claimed that Muradov’s removal is a positive step but stated that Muradov’s
replacement is more important than his removal.[3] Some milbloggers noted that Muradov was
responsible for significant Russian military failures in western Donetsk Oblast, including the high
casualties suffered in the assault against Pavlivka in October-November 2022 and the prolonged and
failed effort to take Vuhledar.[4] Independent Russian investigative outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories),
citing sources close to the Russian General Staff, reported that the Russian General Staff accused
Muradov of being inept due to battlefield failures and significant losses in western Donetsk Oblast,
including the near obliteration of the Tatarstan ”Alga” volunteer battalion.[5] One prominent
milblogger claimed that military authorities are also considering dismissing Western Military District
Commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov, whose forces operate along the Kupyansk-Svatove-
Kreminna line in eastern Ukraine.[6]
ISW cannot confirm the rumors of either Muradov’s or Nikiforov’s dismissals, but it is noteworthy
that Russian milbloggers are discussing potential dismissals of commanders associated with areas of
operation in which Russian forces have been largely unable to secure substantial gains or have
suffered major losses. Russian milbloggers do not appear to be hypothesizing about the removal of
either the Central Military District (CMD) Commander Lieutenant General Andrey Mordvichev or
Southern Military District Commander (SMD) Colonel General Sergey Kuzovlev.[7] Neither the CMD
nor the SMD are heavily committed in critical areas of the front, and Mordvichev and Kuzovlev have
therefore likely avoided becoming targets of Russian command skepticism because they are not
currently responsible for significant failures. The muted information space response to the reported
firings is additionally indicative of broader disillusionment with Russian military command, which
milbloggers have argued for months needs systemic overhauls. Many milbloggers have consistently
praised former Commander of Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine Army General Sergey Surovikin
despite the fall of west (right) bank Kherson Oblast under his command, however. One milblogger
claimed on March 27 that Surovikin may be responsible for defending against a future Ukrainian
counteroffensive and claimed that Surovikin’s military strategy is better than that of Russian Chief of
the General Staff and current Commander of Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine Army General Valery
Gerasimov.[8] Russian authorities and some milbloggers have fixated on identifying and punishing
individual commanders for the failures of their troops, rather than interrogating and resolving
endemic issues in Russian command and control, force structure, and deployment patterns.
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