俄罗斯进攻性战役评估,2023年3月24日

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时间:2023-06-20

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1 Institute for the Study of War and the Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 24, 2023
Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Angela Howard, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, and
Frederick W. Kagan
March 24, 4:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that
ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse
map archive monthly.
Prominent voices in the Russian information space are increasingly setting
information conditions to prepare for a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive. Russian
Security Council Deputy Head Dmitry Medvedev emphasized on March 24 that the Russian General
Staff is aware that Kyiv is preparing for offensive operations and that the Russian General Staff is
considering its own decisions and responses to prepare for a Ukrainian offensive.[1] A prominent
Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian actors are disseminating disinformation about plans for a
Ukrainian attack towards Belgorod Oblast, in order to draw Russian troops to border areas and allow
Ukrainian troops to launch attacks on other sectors of the front, partially echoing Wagner Group
financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s prior warnings about a Ukrainian push on Belgorod Oblast.[2] Another
Russian milblogger warned that Ukrainian forces will likely try to launch a counteroffensive before
the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) gains the capacity to increase production and bolster
Russian defensive potential.[3] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin similarly claimed on
March 23 that he knows of plans for an extensive Ukrainian counteroffensive, as ISW previously
reported.[4] The wider Russian spring offensive appears to be culminating, and the Russian
information space appears to be responding to the slow-down of Russian operations and potential for
Ukraine to regain the initiative with substantial anxiety.[5] Russian military command will need to
commit a significant number of forces to the frontline to either prevent culmination or launch
renewed offensive operations, and it is unlikely that such forces exist at sufficient scale to do either.
Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov has reportedly formed a Wagner Group-
affiliated private military company (PMC) in occupied Crimea. Independent Russian
investigative outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories) reported on March 23 that Aksyonov has publicly sided
with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and
created PMC “Convoy” under the leadership of Prigozhin associate Konstantin Pikalov, who has led
Wagner operations in Africa.[6] PMC ”Convoy” is reportedly a BARS (combat reserve) unit, meaning
that ”Convoy” servicemembers sign two contracts—one with ”Convoy” itself and one with the Russian
MoD.[7] iStories reported that ”Convoy” initially consisted of 300 people and has been deployed to
occupied Kherson Oblast.[8] The iStories report is particularly noteworthy against the backdrop of
Wagner’s and Prigozhin’s continually declining influence in Russia and loss of access to convict
recruits. Prigozhin and Prigozhin-affiliated elements may be trying to diffuse Wagner’s remaining
power by creating separate PMCs and other parallel military formations in addition to launching new
recruitment efforts through traditional channels.[9] Aksyonov additionally appears to have affiliated
himself and the Crimea occupation administration with Prigozhin, which may have important
implications for the role of forces from occupied Crimea in subsequent phases of the war.
Some prominent Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian military command for
continuing to impale Russian forces on Vuhledar with ineffective human-wave style
frontal assaults. The milbloggers claimed that current Russian tactics against Vuhledar, which
include an initial frontal assault followed by assaults against fortified Ukrainian flanks, result in high
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