1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 21, 2023
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan
March 21, 7:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a
dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be setting conditions to weaponize the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) as a method of Russian power projection in advance of Russia’s accession to the
rotating UNSC presidency in April. Russian UN Ambassador Vasily Nebenzya stated during a press conference on
March 21 that Russia plans to hold an informal UNSC meeting in early April to discuss the “real situation” of “Ukrainian
children taken to Russia.”[1] Nebenzya claimed that Russia planned to hold the meeting before the announcement of the
International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrants for Putin and Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria
Lvova-Belova for the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.[2] Nebenzya’s announcement, as well as vitriolic
denials of the ICC’s accusations by Russian officials, come as Kremlin-appointed occupation officials continue to facilitate
the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia under a variety of schemes and guises.[3] Putin additionally made a
number of notable comments proclaiming Russia’s commitment to the UN, UNSC, and the UN charter during his press
conference with Chinese President Xi Jinping on March 21.[4] Taken in tandem, Nebenzya’s and Putin’s comments
suggest that Russia continues to use its position on the UNSC as a base of power projection as the UNSC prepares for
Russia to take the UNSC presidency in April.[5] By setting information conditions to posture about Russia’s supposed
commitment to the UNSC, Putin is positioning himself to continue to weaponize and exploit Russia’s UNSC veto power in
the coming months.
The second day of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit with Russian President Vladimir Putin continued
to suggest that Putin has not been able to secure the no-limits bilateral partnership with China that he
likely hoped for. Putin and Xi signed a “Joint Statement by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China
on Deepening Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation, Entering a New Era” on March 21, which stressed
that Russian–Chinese relations are comprehensive, strategic, and at the highest level in history.[6] The Joint Statement
outlines a variety of bilateral intentions and affirms the commitment of Russia and China to each other’s state sovereignty
and territorial integrity, among other diplomatic promises.[7] The commitments made by Xi and Putin were notably
lopsided, however, indicating the Xi is agreeing to a more reserved version of Russian–Chinese relations than Putin likely
desires, as ISW observed on March 20.[8] Xi praised Putin, reaffirmed China’s commitment to Russia in the UNSC, and
amplified China’s position on a political settlement of the war in Ukraine; but Xi did not go much further than offering
those statements.[9] Putin, by contrast, announced a number of measures that signal Russia’s continued orientation
towards and dependence on China in the energy and economic sectors, which appear very one-sided compared to Xi’s
relatively tempered commitments.[10] Xi additionally did not signal an intent to provide support for Russia’s war in
Ukraine beyond vague diplomatic assurances, which is likely a step down from what Putin hoped to secure in negotiations.
Putin has likely failed to secure the exact sort of partnership that he needs and desires, and Xi will likely leave Moscow
having secured assurances that are more one-sided than Putin intended them to be. Putin observed that Russia and China
had “a very substantiative and candid exchange of views” on the prospects for the further development of the Russian–
Chinese relations. Such rhetoric notably lacks the language normally used in diplomatic readouts to indicate that the two
parties have come to definitive and substantive agreements.
Putin portrayed the Western provision of depleted uranium ammunition to Ukraine as a significant
escalation in order to bolster information operations aiming to deter Western security assistance to
Ukraine and to place the onus for negotiations on the West. Putin claimed on March 21, while discussing the
Chinese peace plan, that the West is beginning to use weapons with a “nuclear” component in a response to the UK’s
announcement that it would provide Ukraine with shells with depleted uranium.[11] Putin claimed that the UK’s provision
of depleted uranium shells indicated that the West is not ready for a “peaceful settlement.“[12] Anti-tank munitions in the
West are commonly made of depleted uranium—that is, uranium that is less radioactive than natural uranium—due to its
high density and the penetrative effect it generates. Such munitions cannot be used to produce either nuclear or
radiological weapons. Putin seeks to portray the provision of depleted uranium shells as escalatory in order to deter
Western security assistance despite the shells not containing any fissile or radiological material.
The Wagner Group may lose most of its convict force in the upcoming weeks as convicts finish their six-
month military contracts. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) assessed that thousands of Wagner convicts who were
