1 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 18, 2023
Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angela Howard, Kateryna
Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan
March 18, 7:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISWs interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISWs archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion
of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW
produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map
archive monthly.
Russian forces targeted Ukraine with 16 Shahed-136 drones overnight on March 17-18.
Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat stated that Ukrainian forces shot down 11 of the 16
drones and noted that it is difficult for Ukrainian mobile fire groups to shoot down drones at night due
to the lack of visibility.
1
The drones targeted facilities in Kyiv, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Lviv
oblasts, reportedly including a Ukrainian fuel warehouse in Novomoskovsk, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
2
Russian sources claimed that Russian drone strikes also targeted Kyiv Thermal Power Plant 5, which
Russian forces reportedly targeted in a strike campaign on March 9.
3
Russian President Vladimir Putin continued his campaign against anti-war dissent and
the misappropriation of military assets within Russia. Putin signed two bills into law on March
18 that significantly increase the fines and jail time for discrediting Russian forces in Ukraine and for
selling Russian arms to foreign actors.
4
Russian sources reported that Russian Federal Security Service
(FSB) personnel detained over 40 people in raids against two Moscow bars for suspicion of financing
Ukrainian forces and made patrons participate in pro-war activities on March 17.
5
Russian sources have
increasingly reported on FSB detaining Russian civilians under suspicion of financially assisting
Ukrainian forces since February 28 after Putin instructed the FSB to intensify counterintelligence
measures and crackdown against the spread of pro-Ukrainian ideology.
6
Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigohzin is likely attempting to set informational conditions
to explain the Wagner Groups culmination around Bakhmut. Prigozhin-affiliated outlet RIA
FAN published an interview with Prigozhin on March 17 in which he asserted that Ukrainian forces are
preparing to launch counteroffensives in five separate directions: into Belgorod Oblast, in the Kreminna
area, in the Bakhmut area, towards Donetsk City, and in Zaporizhia Oblast.
7
Prigozhin stated that
Ukrainian forces will launch these operations starting in mid-April and urged Russian forces to prepare
for these counteroffensives by preserving ammunition and equipment.
8
Prigozhin likely depicted
Ukrainian forces as having enough combat power to launch a massive theater-wide counteroffensive to
justify the Wagner Groups inability to complete an envelopment or encirclement of Bakhmut.
Prigozhin stated that Ukrainian forces are preparing to counterattack Wagners flanks in the Bakhmut
area and that Wagner fighters are preparing for these counterattacks.
9
ISW previously assessed that
Wagner fighters are likely conducting opportunistic attacks on easier-to-seize settlements further north
and northwest of Bakhmut as their ability to make tactical gains in Bakhmut itself diminishes, and
Prigozhin likely seeks to frame these activities as securing flanks in preparation for Ukrainian
counteroffensives.
10
A prominent Wagner-affiliated milblogger similarly argued that Wagner fighters
