俄罗斯进攻性战役评估,2023年3月16日

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1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 16, 2023
Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Angela Howard, George Barros, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, and
Frederick W. Kagan
March 16, 6:15 ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These
maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic
frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
The Russian Federal State Security Service (FSB) appears to be trying to penetrate the Russian Defense
Industrial Base (DIB) in a way that is reminiscent of the KGB’s involvement with the Soviet military
establishment. Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Center for the Research of Trophy and Prospective Weapons and Military
Equipment of the Ukrainian General Staff Andrii Rudyk remarked on March 16 that Ukrainian experts have found FSB
markings on many Russian weapons components that Ukrainian forces have destroyed or captured on the
battlefield.[1] Rudyk noted that these markings appear not only on equipment such as T-90M tanks, but also on weapons’
microcircuits, and suggested that this means that the FSB conducted an equipment inspection of such weapons and
components.[2] Rudyk concluded that this means that the FSB does not trust Russian military leadership and is conducting
inspections of Russian equipment accordingly.[3] FSB markings on Russian equipment and weapons components, if
confirmed, would have broader implications for the relationship between the FSB, the Russian DIB, and the broader Russian
military apparatus. Either FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov has instructed the FSB to conduct these investigations at the
direction of Russian President Vladimir Putin, or Bortnikov has issued this directive independent of Putin. In either case
the FSB appears to be directly inserting itself into the inner workings of the Russian DIB, likely penetrating equipment
acquisition and inspection processes. The KGB (the FSB’s predecessor) notably penetrated the Red Army and Soviet defense
industry in a similar fashion.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that he received a press question exposing a plot
spearheaded by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai
Patrushev to undermine and “neutralize” the Wagner Group. Prigozhin’s press service published a claimed
request for comment on March 16 from Russian outlet Nezavisimaya Gazeta asking if Prigozhin was aware of alleged
discussions between Putin and Patrushev regarding the future of the Wagner Group.[4] The press comment claims that
information on these discussions has recently circulated on Russian and Ukrainian Telegram channels and alleges that
Patrushev suggested to Putin that there will be “nothing left” of Wagner in “one and a half to two months.”[5] The post goes
on to claim that Patrushev suggested that upon Wagner’s destruction in Ukraine, Prigozhin will try to “unite the former and
remaining active Wagner fighters under a far-fetched pretext,” arm them, and ”send them to the territory of Russia in order
to seize power in the regions bordering Ukraine with a possible advance inland.”[6] The post concludes that Patrushev has
already ordered observation and control over the movement of former Wagner fighters and that Putin reportedly agreed
with this step and thanked Patrushev for his efforts to “neutralize Wagner in general and Yevgeny Prigozhin in
particular.”[7] Prigozhin posted an audio clip in response to the claimed press comment saying that he had not heard about
these supposed negotiations or observed speculation on Telegram channels, remarking that Russian special services should
work to neutralize threats to Russia regardless of where they come from.[8]
ISW has not observed any information to suggest that these discussions have happened, nor has ISW captured any
speculation in the Russian information space about them. Nezivisimaya Gazeta has not published the press comment on
its own site, and no record of the comment is visible anywhere other than in references to the post by Prigozhin’s press
service. The lack of external confirmation on this subject suggests that Prigozhin has fabricated the alleged plot to further
several information operations on behalf of Wagner and his own reputation. First, this exchange clearly identifies Patrushev
and possibly the Russian Security Council as enemies of the Wagner Group. Prigozhin appears to be setting careful
information conditions to blame Patrushev for Wagner’s failures and potential crackdowns against the group, as well as
introducing an invented scenario wherein Wagner poses a direct threat to Russia domestically. This effort appears to be the
next evolution of Prigozhin’s campaign against the Russian military establishment, and Patrushev could become Prigozhin’s
next target after his concerted informational campaigns against the Russian Ministry of Defense and General Staff.[9]
Western news agencies confirmed on March 16 that Chinese companies have sold rifles, drone parts, and
equipment that could be used for military purposes to unidentified Russian entities. Politico cited data
provided by customs data aggregator ImportGenius showing that Chinese companies sent equipment including 1,000
assault rifles, 12 shipments of drone parts, and over 12 tons of body armor to unspecified Russian actors between June and
December 2022.[10] CNN also reported on March 16 that Ukrainian forces shot down a retrofitted, weaponized commercial
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