1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 11, 2023
Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, George Barros, Nicole Wolkov, Angela Howard, and Frederick W. Kagan
March 11, 3:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These
maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic
frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Russian forces did not make any confirmed advances within Bakhmut on March 11. Ukrainian and Russian
sources continue to report heavy fighting in the city, but Wagner Group fighters are likely becoming increasingly pinned in
urban areas, such as the AZOM industrial complex, and are therefore finding it difficult to make significant advances.[1] ISW
will continue to monitor and report on the situation in Bakhmut as it unfolds.
Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova confirmed that there is infighting in the
Kremlin inner circle, that the Kremlin has ceded centralized control over the Russian information space,
and that Russian President Vladimir Putin apparently cannot readily fix it. Kremlin journalists, academics, and
Novorossiya supporters held a forum on the “practical and technological aspects of information and cognitive warfare in
modern realities” in Moscow on March 11.[2] During a panel discussion Zakharova stated that the Kremlin cannot replicate
the Stalinist approach of establishing a modern equivalent to the Soviet Information Bureau to centrally control Russia’s
internal information space due to fighting among unspecified Kremlin “elites.”[3]
Zakharova’s statement is noteworthy and supports several of ISW’s longstanding assessments about deteriorating Kremlin
regime and information space control dynamics. The statement supports several assessments: that there is Kremlin
infighting between key members of Putin’s inner circle; that Putin has largely ceded the Russian information space over
time to a variety of quasi-independent actors; and that Putin is apparently unable to take decisive action to regain control
over the Russian information space.[4] It is unclear why Zakharova — a seasoned senior spokesperson — would have openly
acknowledged these problems in a public setting. Zakharova may have directly discussed these problems for the first time
to temper Russian nationalist milbloggers’ expectations regarding the current capabilities of the Kremlin to cohere around
a unified narrative — or possibly even a unified policy.
Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin said that he would transform the Wagner Group into a hardline
ideological elite parallel military organization after the Battle of Bakhmut. Prigozhin stated on March 11 that
the Wagner Group will start a new wave of recruitment after the envisioned capture of Bakhmut and reform itself into an
army with an ideological component.[5] The Wagner Group has recently been expanding recruitment centers throughout
Russia, including centers and programs focused on recruiting youth.[6] A Russian regional news source stated on March 11
that the Wagner Group has opened six recruitment centers in schools and youth sports clubs in Altai, Zabaykalsky, and
Krasnoyarsk krais and Irkutsk Oblast.[7] A Russian opposition news source reported on March 11 that the Ministry of
Education in Apatity, Murmansk Oblast included Wagner personnel at a career guidance lesson to tell “heroic stories” and
promote the Wagneryonok [“little Wagner”] youth group and summer camp in Crimea.[8] The Wagner Group likely aims
to recruit more impressionable recruits through these youth-focused campaigns and instill in them Prigozhin’s extremist
ideological brand of Russian ultranationalism. Prigozhin may be attempting to restructure the Wagner Group into a hardline
ideological elite parallel military organization to carve out a specialized role among Russian forces in Ukraine as its former
role in solely securing tactical gains dissipates with the Wagner Group’s likely culmination around Bakhmut.
Key Takeaways
• Russian forces did not make any confirmed advances within Bakhmut on March 11.
• Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova confirmed that there is infighting in
the Kremlin inner circle, that the Kremlin has ceded centralized control over the Russian
information space, and implicitly that Russian President Vladimir Putin cannot fix it.
• Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin said that he would transform the Wagner Group into a
hardline ideological elite parallel military organization after the Battle of Bakhmut.
• Ukrainian sources report that Ukrainian forces advanced toward Svatove.
• Russian forces continue to establish fortifications in Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian mobilized soldiers continue to publicize complaints that commanders treat them
poorly and used them as expendable manpower to patch holes in existent formations.
