俄罗斯进攻性战役评估,2023年3月10日

VIP文档

ID:63863

阅读量:0

大小:4.21 MB

页数:15页

时间:2023-06-20

金币:2

上传者:神经蛙1号
1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 10, 2023
Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, George Barros, and Mason Clark
March 10, 5:15pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These
maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic
frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
US intelligence warned that individuals with ties to Russian intelligence may be planning to attempt to
instigate an insurrection in Moldova. CNN reported on March 10 that White House officials believe that Russian
intelligence-linked individuals are planning to stage protests against the Moldovan government with the intent of fomenting
a “manufactured insurrection” to install a pro-Russian administration in Moldova.[1] CNN reported that the US believes
Russia has been spreading disinformation about Moldova’s purported instability and supporting it with information
operations emanating from Russian-occupied Transnistria.[2] ISW has recently reported on several ongoing information
operations in Transnistria premised on undermining the Moldovan government and sewing distrust of Ukraine and the
West.[3]
Russian forces continue to establish defensive lines in rear areas far from current frontlines and areas in
Russia that will likely never see fighting. Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov claimed on March 9 that
Russian authorities finished constructing the “zasechnaya line” of fortifications along Belgorod Oblast’s border with
Ukraine.[4] Gladkov claimed that Russian forces should dedicate troops to defending this system of fortifications in case of
an implausible Ukrainian attack on Belgorod Oblast. Russian forces would significantly misallocate forces that would be
better suited supporting active offensive operations elsewhere in Ukraine by manning these fortifications. Gladkov also
claimed that Russian officials spent 10 billion rubles (about $132 million) constructing the defensive line, a likely waste of
funds amid questions about Russia’s ability to fund its war effort in Ukraine.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported
on March 10 that Russian forces continued building fortifications along Kursk Oblast‘s border with Ukraine, another area
that will likely never see fighting.[6] Occupied Crimea head Sergey Aksyonov claimed on March 10 that Russian forces are
constructing a defensive line in Crimea and implied that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the construction of the
line.[7] These fortifications are far away from the current frontlines in southern Ukraine, and any Russian personnel and
equipment deployed to these lines would similarly be better suited elsewhere in Ukraine. Russian officials in Kursk and
Belgorod oblasts may be constructing defensive fortifications in support of information operations that aim to portray
Ukraine as threatening Russian territory in order to frame the war in Ukraine as existential for Russia. Continued Russian
fortifications in Crimea may suggest that Russian forces are unsure of their ability to hold occupied territories in southern
Ukraine in the long term. ISW has not observed Russian forces deployed to any of these defensive lines at this time, and the
fortifications are therefore currently inconsequential for Russian operations in Ukraine.
Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights, Maria Lvova-Belova, confirmed that the Russian government
is using a variety of schemes to deport Ukrainian children to Russia in a comment that was apparently
meant to disprove Western allegations of the illegality of these actions. In a Telegram post published on March
10, Lvova-Belova accused the West of artificially manufacturing fear regarding the deportation and forced adoption of
Ukrainian children and claimed that children came to occupied areas of Ukraine and Russian territory “voluntarily” and can
return to their families.[8] Lvova-Belova admitted that Russian authorities have taken children from Kherson, Zaporizhia,
and Kharkiv oblasts to “sanatoriums” and health camps in occupied Crimea and Krasnodar Krai for “rest” and protection
from hostilities and claimed that 89 “children of Ukrainian citizens” will be reunited with their families from such programs
in Crimea and Krasnodar Krai.[9] ISW has previously reported on such schemes to remove children from Ukraine under
the guise of rest and relaxation programs and noted that several children in Krasnodar Krai and Crimea have been held for
forced adoption into Russian families.[10] An independent investigation by Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab found that
of likely over 14,700 Ukrainian children deported to Russia, only 126 returned to Ukraine as of January 2023.[11] Lvova-
Belova's claim that a certain number of Ukrainian children are being returned to their families does not negate the reality
that the vast majority of abducted children do not return to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that the forced deportation
and adoption of Ukrainian children is an apparent violation of the Geneva Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of Genocide, as well as a component of a wider ethnic cleaning campaign.[12]
Key Takeaways
US intelligence warned that individuals with ties to Russian intelligence may be planning to
attempt to instigate an insurrection in Moldova.
资源描述:

当前文档最多预览五页,下载文档查看全文

此文档下载收益归作者所有

当前文档最多预览五页,下载文档查看全文
温馨提示:
1. 部分包含数学公式或PPT动画的文件,查看预览时可能会显示错乱或异常,文件下载后无此问题,请放心下载。
2. 本文档由用户上传,版权归属用户,天天文库负责整理代发布。如果您对本文档版权有争议请及时联系客服。
3. 下载前请仔细阅读文档内容,确认文档内容符合您的需求后进行下载,若出现内容与标题不符可向本站投诉处理。
4. 下载文档时可能由于网络波动等原因无法下载或下载错误,付费完成后未能成功下载的用户请联系客服处理。
关闭