1 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 8, 2023
Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, George
Barros, Layne Philipson, and Mason Clark
March 8, 7:45 pm ET
Click here to see ISWs interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISWs archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion
of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW
produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map
archive monthly.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin announced on March 8 that Russian forces
captured all of eastern Bakhmut, a claim consistent with available visual evidence.
1
ISW
assessed on March 7 that Ukrainian forces completed a controlled withdrawal from eastern Bakhmut
across the Bakhmutka River.
2
A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control
between 45 to 52 percent of Bakhmut as of March 7.
3
This figure is reasonable; ISW assesses that
Russian forces now occupy at least 50 percent of Bakhmut as of March 8. Russian forces will likely
intensify attacks in northwestern and southwestern Bakhmut (north from Opytne and south from
Yahidne, respectively) to circumnavigate the Bakhmutka River.
Russian forces remain unlikely to rapidly exploit a breakthrough beyond Bakhmut if
Russian forces capture the city. Prigozhin implied on March 8 that the Russian Ministry of
Defense used the Wagner Group to bear the brunt of high-intensity attritional urban warfare in
Bakhmut and may discard the Wagner Group after capturing Bakhmut so conventional Russian units
can continue to attack.
4
Prigozhin did not provide an assessment of the likelihood of success of future
Russian offensive operations beyond Bakhmut. ISW has not observed any indicators that the Russian
military has a well-equipped and prepared reserve force to advance beyond Bakhmut. Most observed
Russian units in Donbas are already engaged in offensive operations, including Russian airborne (VDV)
elements that joined the Russian offensive in Bakhmut in January 2023.
5
ISW continues to assess that
the Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine will shortly culminate if Russian forces capture Bakhmut, as
the Russian military does not have the combat power or reinforcements necessary to exploit a
breakthrough near Bakhmut.
6
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated on March 8 that the
Russian capture of Bakhmut would not necessarily reflect any turning point of the war.
7
US Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines stated on March 8 that Russian
President Vladimir Putin likely recognizes the Russian militarys current limited
capability to sustain a short-term offensive and may pursue a protracted war.
8
Haines
stated on March 8 that Putin is likely only temporarily focused on pursuing short-term military
objectives in Ukraine and may believe that prolonging the war will increase the likelihood of achieving
his strategic goals. ISW has previously assessed that Putin maintains maximalist war goals in Ukraine
despite Russian forces currently limited capabilities to achieve these goals.
9
Haines stated that Russia
will increasingly struggle to maintain its current tempo of operations in Ukraine without conducting
full mobilization and securing adequate ammunition to mitigate Russias current shortage. Haines
noted that Russian forces are suffering high losses to take Bakhmut, which Haines characterized as not
