Institute for the Study of War and
the Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 1, 2023
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, George Barros,
Layne Philipson, and Mason Clark
March 1, 6:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion
of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW
produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map
archive monthly.
The Kremlin may leverage an amendment to Russia’s Criminal Code increasing
punishments for "discrediting" the war in Ukraine to promote further self-censorship
among the critical ultranationalist community, prompting pushback from Wagner
Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and prominent milbloggers. Chairman of the Russian
State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin announced on March 1 that the Duma could ratify amendments to the
Russian Criminal Code introducing harsher punishments for discrediting participants of the Russian
"special military operation," including "volunteers," as soon as March 14.
The Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) labels irregular armed formations fighting in Ukraine—specifically the Wagner Group—
as volunteers. Volodin stated punishments would include a fine of up to five million rubles (about
$66,450), five years of correctional or forced labor, or a sentence of 15 years in prison.
Russian
President Vladimir Putin previously stated on February 28 that Russia must "identify and stop illegal
activities of those who are trying to weaken [Russian] society" and identify those who "use separatism,
nationalism, neo-Nazism as a weapon."
Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has long called on the
Kremlin to punish anyone who spoke poorly of Wagner under the guise of ensuring that all participants
of the war are protected under existing laws against discrediting the Russian Armed Forces. However,
Prigozhin released a suggested adjustment to the amendments in response to Volodin’s statement,
arguing the amendment should not punish criticism of senior Russian MoD and Wagner Group
commanders.
Prigozhin argued constructive criticism "is necessary" to ensure Russian commanders
use their powers "transparently and responsibly." Prigozhin may be concerned that the Kremlin could
use the expanded amendment to crack down on or, at minimum, promote self-censorship practices
among ultranationalist milblogger communities who regularly criticize senior Russian commanders,
and likely seeks to balance his desired protection of the Wagner Group with retaining the freedom for
himself and friendly milbloggers to criticize the Russian military.
ISW assessed on February 26 that Putin has allowed the ultranationalist community to expand its
influence at the expense of the Russian MoD so the Kremlin can leverage the community’s pre-
established networks to recruit volunteers.
The Kremlin likely seeks to mitigate further pushback from
the pro-war ultranationalist community, which continues to look up to Putin as the facilitator of the
war despite their criticisms of the conduct of the war. The State Duma will likely pass these amendments
on March 14, given Volodin’s announcement. The Kremlin could use these amendments to promote
self-censorship among select milbloggers whose constituencies are no longer needed for its force
generation or crowdfunding campaigns, or whose criticisms have exceeded the Kremlin’s tolerance for
open criticism. It is unclear to what extent such measures would scare Russian milbloggers into self-
censorship, however. Former Russian officer (and avid critic of Putin) Igor Girkin mocked Volodin’s
