1 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 28, 2023
Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, George Barros, Nicole Wolkov,
Angela Howard, and Frederick W. Kagan
February 28, 6:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian authorities appear to be escalating their promotion of false flag information operations
to distract from their lack of tangible battlefield gains and slow down the provision of Western
tanks and other aid in advance of expected Ukrainian counter-offensives. The Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) accused the “US and its accomplices” on February 28 of planning to carry out a provocation in
Ukraine using toxic chemicals.
1
The Russian MoD relatedly claimed on February 19 that Ukrainian officials are
planning false-flag attacks at hazardous radiation facilities in Ukraine to accuse Russian forces of
indiscriminately striking such sites.
2
The apparent uptick in fallacious biochemical and nuclear false flag
warnings accompanies a concerted Russian false flag information operation accusing Ukraine of preparing for
an invasion of Russian-occupied Transnistria, Moldova.
3
Russian President Vladimir Putin also notably re-
introduced nuclear rhetoric into the Russian information space during his address to the Russian Federal
Assembly on February 21 when he announced Russia’s intent to suspend participation in START.
4
The recent
resurgence of several standard Russian information operations in the form of false flag warnings and tired
nuclear threats suggests that Russian officials are increasingly trying to mitigate the informational impacts of a
continued lack of Russian battlefield successes as well as to slow down the provision of Western tanks and other
equipment in advance of expected Ukrainian counter-offensives. ISW has previously reported on the correlation
between Russian information operations and battlefield realities, particularly when Russian forces are failing to
take significant ground in offensive operations in Ukraine.
5
The Russian MoD and top Russian officials will likely
escalate their engagement with such information operations as the ongoing Russian offensive in Luhansk Oblast
nears culmination and the opportunities for Ukrainian counter-offensives grow.
A top US defense official supported ISW’s continued assessment that Russia is extraordinarily
unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl stated that
the US does not assess that Russia will use nuclear weapons during a House Armed Service Committee hearing
on American military support for Ukraine on February 28.
6
ISW has assessed that Russian invocations of nuclear
threats and nuclear doctrine are part of an information operation meant to discourage Ukraine and the West but
do not represent any material Russian intent to employ nuclear weapons.
7
Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed the Federal Security Service (FSB) board on
February 28 and emphasized the role of the FSB in supporting the war in Ukraine in a law
enforcement and counterterrorism capacity. Putin lauded the FSB for its direct participation in the war
in “non-standard field tasks” such as protection of the Russian border and cracking down on terrorist activities,
organized crime, corruption, and extremism.
8
Putin also emphasized that the FSB’s primary purpose is to
support the Russian Armed Forces and Rosgvardia in their efforts to accomplish the objectives of the “special
military operation” and noted the FSB’s role in preventing incursions of Ukrainian sabotage groups onto Russian
territory.
9
Putin has frequently invoked mentions of domestic security, law enforcement, and counterterrorism
efforts when speaking about the war in Ukraine in order to portray the war as a threat to Russian internal security
and to bring the war closer to his domestic constituency as ISW has previously reported.
10
Putin’s address to the
FSB similarly aligns the FSB and its traditional domestic law enforcement and counterterrorism role with
