Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s
Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 23, 2023
Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, and
Frederick W. Kagan
February 23, 7 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions for false flag operations on the Chernihiv Oblast
international border and in Moldova ahead of the one-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale
invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian Northern Operational Command reported on February 23 that Russian forces
are preparing possible false flag operations in the international border areas of Chernihiv Oblast.
The Ukrainian
Northern Operational Command stated that Ukrainian intelligence has already observed Russian convoys with
unmarked military equipment and personnel dressed in uniforms resembling those worn by the Ukrainian
military move to areas near the Chernihiv Oblast border. The Ukrainian Northern Operational Command stated
that the purpose of these false flag operations would be to accuse Ukrainian forces of violating the territorial
integrity of an unspecified country, very likely referring to Belarus. The Kremlin may be preparing false flag
attacks to coerce Belarus into the war following Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko February 16
statement that Belarus would only enter the war if attacked by Ukraine.
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense also
notably claimed on February 21 that Belarusian forces observed a buildup of Ukrainian forces at its borders.
ISW continues to assess that Belarusian or Russian attack on northern Ukrainian regions is highly unlikely, but
Russia seeks to force Lukashenko’s hand or blame Ukraine for expanding the war to undermine support for Kyiv.
Such a false flag operation could also aim to fix Ukrainian forces at the northern border in an effort to weaken
Ukrainian defenses in eastern Ukraine and preparations for counter-offensive operations.
The Kremlin also appears to be setting information conditions to stage a false flag operation in occupied
Transnistria, Moldova. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 23 that Ukrainian forces
are planning to conduct an armed provocation against Transnistria in the near future.
The MoD claimed that
Ukrainian forces would dress as Russian military personnel and stage an alleged Russian offensive from positions
in Transnistria.
The Moldovan government denied the Russian MoD’s allegations.
The MoD likely sought to
foster this false narrative to twist Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky‘s warning to Moldovan President
Maia Sandu that the Kremlin was preparing provocations in Moldova and his offer to help Moldova if Russian
forces in Transnistria threaten the territorial integrity of Ukraine.
The MoD’s dissemination of this false
narrative does not indicate that Putin intends to attack Moldova—an undertaking for which he lacks military
capability—although it points toward an escalation in his ongoing efforts to undermine the Moldovan state.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to deliver boilerplate rhetoric in public addresses
that offered him opportunities he did not take to shape the Russian information space ahead of
the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Putin marked Defenders of the Fatherland
Day on February 23 with a video address in which he reiterated tired Kremlin talking points arguing that the
Russian military is fighting neo-Nazism in Ukraine and protecting “our people in our historical lands.”
Putin
delivered vague remarks that the Russian military is improving the training of its units and continuing to supply
advanced equipment to its forces.
Putin also asserted that Russian industry is quickly increasing the production
of a broad range of conventional weapons and preparing for the mass production of advanced models of military
equipment, although ISW assesses that Russia continues to gradually prepare its defense industrial base (DIB)
for a protracted war instead of engaging in wider rapid economic mobilization.
Putin’s speech did not offer
specific goals or objectives for the war on Ukraine, but instead continued generic rhetorical lines of effort aiming
to prepare the Russian public for a protracted war in Ukraine. Putin’s refusal to use the public address to issue
specific goals or policies ahead of the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine suggests that Putin
