https://crsreports.congress.gov
March 8, 2024
Russian Military Performance and Outlook
Despite advantages of a larger recruitment base and defense
industrial capacity, the Russian military has been unable to
decisively defeat the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) since
Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The Russian
military has suffered significant losses in personnel and
equipment. Its performance arguably has been hindered by
a rigid command and control structure, a weakened corps of
trained and professional units, and a reliance on tactics with
high casualty rates. The Russian military, however, remains
a resilient and capable adversary.
Since 2022, Congress has supported Ukraine’s defense
against Russia’s renewed invasion. In November 2023
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian
Affairs James O’Brien assessed,
Ukrainian forces have used Western weapons to
great effect against Russian forces: Ukraine has
liberated a significant part of its territory initially
seized by Russia. It destroyed thousands of Russian
tanks and combat vehicles as well as hundreds of
aircraft, and Russia has suffered a significant loss of
combat power.
Nevertheless, the Russian military continues to launch
offensive operations and, in February 2024, captured the
Ukrainian town of Avdiivka. Members may consider the
Russian military’s condition and performance as they
evaluate the state of the war, assess the effectiveness of
U.S. sanctions, and debate whether to appropriate additional
military assistance for Ukraine.
Command and Control
Despite attempted reforms to increase lower-level
leadership and autonomy, the Russian military arguably
continues to operate with a Soviet-style centralized
command. This command style at the tactical level often
has contributed to the types of inflexible operations that
contributed to previous failures and casualties.
Some observers argue that Russia’s leadership prioritizes
the perceived political loyalty of officers over their
battlefield effectiveness, particularly since the June 2023
Wagner Group mutiny, in which a Russian private military
company engaged in armed revolt against Russia’s military
leadership. Multiple Russian military leaders, including
some reported to be among the most competent, have been
relieved of command, apparently for perceived criticism of,
or insufficient loyalty to, Russian political leaders.
Nevertheless, the Russian military leadership remains a
cohesive force. It has gradually consolidated various semi-
independent security force units and organizations fighting
for Russia and brought them under its central command.
Additionally, the Russian military leadership has proven
capable of adaptation and of implementing changes in force
structure, operations, and equipment since the 2022
invasion. Observers continue to debate the speed and
breadth of these changes, as reforms in some cases appear
isolated to addressing specific problems or implemented
after extended debate that leads to delays.
Personnel
In January 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated
that Russia had over 600,000 personnel in Ukraine, while
some observers estimate the number at 470,000 forces.
Continued casualties and challenges fielding well-trained
troops have hindered, but not stopped, Russian military
operations.
Casualties
U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly estimated in
December 2023 that the Russian military had suffered
315,000 killed and injured. The rates arguably reflect the
continued use of tactics that resulted in high casualty rates
in the past. These tactics include a reliance on massed
personnel attacks, indiscriminate artillery fire, and limited
tactical-level flexibility. Casualty totals likely include
mobilized personnel, volunteers, National Guard, recruited
prison convicts, and personnel from Russian-occupied
Ukrainian regions. Overall, the casualties represent 87% of
Russia’s estimated pre-war ground strength of about
360,000 personnel.
The loss of experienced soldiers has been particularly
detrimental to the effectiveness and capability of the
Russian military. Many of Russia’s casualties have been
among elite and professional soldiers, as well as the junior
officer corps. New recruits often have less training than
those they are replacing, exacerbating the impact of the
losses and apparently eroding the effectiveness of some
Russian military units. Some observers say the loss of such
experienced troops will have a long-term detrimental effect
on Russian military capabilities.
Recruitment and Mobilization
To replenish the Russian military’s ranks, President Putin
has increased the military’s official size to 1.32 million.
Russian authorities announced a mobilization of 300,000
personnel in September 2022 but have yet to announce
another large-scale mobilization, likely due at least in part
to domestic political considerations. There are some
indications of growing dissent, including public protests by
the families of mobilized personnel. Some observers posit
that Putin is unlikely to announce another mobilization until
after the scheduled March 2024 Russian presidential
elections.
