Photo: Fei Huang via Getty Images
In the coming years, the United States’ nuclear arsenal is likely to change in two important
ways. First, recent statements by Biden administration officials suggest the United States
may expand its nuclear modernization plans. In a speech on August 1, 2024, former acting
assistant secretary of defense for space policy Vipin Narang stated, “Absent a change in the
nuclear trajectories of the PRC, Russia, and North Korea, we may reach a point where a
change in the size or posture of our current deployed forces is necessary.” The reason for a
potential expansion is the rapidly changing strategic landscape, and the growth of Russian
and Chinese arsenals with no arms control agreements to constrain them or prevent arms
racing. To maintain a credible deterrent for the new strategic landscape, the argument goes,
the United States should revisit and potentially expand its nuclear modernization plans.
Updating nuclear command, control, and communication will be an essential piece of nuclear
modernization plans. Nuclear command, control, and communication enables the president
to decide when, where, and how to use nuclear weapons and communicate that decision to
strategic forces. Nuclear command and control is often described as the “fourth leg” of the
nuclear triad, which includes intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), nuclear-armed
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and nuclear-capable aircraft. But that description of a
