1 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 29
Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, Karolina Hird,
Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 29, 7:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map
is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Likely Ukrainian forces conducted an attack against a Grigorovich-class frigate of
the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) near Sevastopol with unmanned surface vehicles on
October 29. Social media footage documented an unknown number of unmanned surface
vehicles striking at least one Grigorovich-class frigate in Sevastopol on October 29.
1
Footage also
showed smoke near the port in Sevastopol and what appeared to be Russian air defense in
Sevastopol engaging air targets.
2
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian
forces used seven autonomous maritime drones and nine unmanned aerial vehicles to conduct a
“terrorist attack” against the BSF and civilian targets in Sevastopol.
3
Attacks on military vessels
in wartime are legitimate acts of war and not terrorist attacks. The Russian MoD claimed that
Russian forces destroyed all air targets, destroyed four maritime drones on the outer roadstead,
and three maritime drones on the inner roadstead. A similar unidentified unmanned surface
vehicle first appeared on the coast of Crimea on September 21.
4
Damage to Black Sea Fleet vessels is unclear at this time. The Russian MoD claimed that the attack
inflicted minor damage against BSF minesweeper Ivan Golubets and a protective barrier in the
south bay.
5
Russian officials did not acknowledge any damage to a Grigorovich-class frigate,
similar to how the Russian MoD denied any damage to the cruiser Moskva when Ukrainian forces
sunk it on April 14. Ukrainian officials have not claimed responsibility for the attack as of this
publication.
The Russian Foreign Ministry announced that Russia indefinitely suspended its participation in
the United Nations-brokered grain export deal with Ukraine due to the attack on October 29.
6
Russia had been setting rhetorical conditions to withdraw from the deal for some time, however.
The Black Sea Fleet has three Grigorovich-class frigates, all of which are capable of firing Kalibr
cruise missiles. A Ukrainian decision to target Kalibr-capable frigate at this time makes sense
given the intensified Russian drone and missile strike campaign targeting Ukrainian energy
infrastructure. If Kyiv ordered this attack, it would have been a proportionate, even restrained,
response to the extensive Russian strategic bombing campaign attacking civilian targets
throughout Ukraine over the past few weeks.
The Kremlin reportedly relieved the commander of the Central Military District
(CMD), Colonel General Alexander Lapin, of his position as the commander of the
“central” group of forces in Ukraine. The Kremlin has not officially confirmed Lapin’s relief
as of October 29, prompting the rise of contradictory reports across Kremlin-sponsored outlets
and Telegram channels. Kremlin-sponsored outlets cited reports from Chechnya-based TV
channel “Grozny,” milbloggers, and other unnamed official sources that Lapin no longer
commands Russian forces in northern Luhansk Oblast.
7
Some Russian milbloggers claimed that
Lapin resigned on his own initiative, while others claimed that he was unfairly terminated.
8
A
Wagner-affiliated milblogger claimed that Lapin lost his position due to his devastating failure to
deploy and organize mobilized men in his zone of responsibility, and ISW has previously reported
