1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 30
Frederick W. Kagan
October 30, 5:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, October 30. This report forecasts
that Russia will continue to conduct conventional military operations well into 2023 rather
than escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons or scaling back its objectives in
pursuit of some off-ramp. It considers the timelines of Russian force generation and
deployment, of weather effects, and of Moscow’s efforts to freeze Europe into surrender. It
includes a summary of battlefield activities that will be described in more detail in
tomorrow’s update.
Russian President Vladimir Putin will most likely try to continue conventional military
operations in Ukraine to hold currently occupied territories, gain new ground, and set
conditions for the collapse of Western support for Ukraine that he likely expects to occur
this winter. Putin has likely not abandoned hopes of achieving his maximalist aims in Ukraine through
conventional military means, which he is pursuing in parallel with efforts to break Ukraine’s will to fight
and the West’s will to continue supporting Kyiv.[1] Putin is unlikely to escalate to the use of tactical
nuclear weapons barring the sudden collapse of the Russian military permitting Ukrainian forces to make
uncontrolled advances throughout the theater.[2] Such a situation is possible but unlikely. Putin is
extraordinarily unlikely to seek direct military conflict with NATO. Putin is very likely to continue to hint
at the possibility of Russian tactical nuclear use and attacks on NATO, however, as parts of his effort to
break Western will to continue supporting Ukraine.
This forecast rests on two assessments. First, that Putin is setting conditions to continue
throwing poorly prepared Russian troops directly into the fighting in Ukraine for the
foreseeable future rather than pausing operations to reconstitute effective military forces.
Second, that Putin’s theory of victory relies on using the harsh winter to break Europe’s
will. These assessments offer a series of timelines that support the forecast.
Russian force-generation efforts will occur over the course of several predictable time
periods. Putin has declared that the “partial mobilization” of reservists is complete.[3] That declaration
means that, in principle, the Russian military will stop calling up reservists and instead focus on
completing their brief training periods before sending them to fight in Ukraine. ISW previously assessed
that most of the remaining called-up reservists will arrive in the theater of war over the next few weeks.[4]
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu announced that continued reserve mobilization efforts will take
the form of renewed efforts to recruit “volunteers,” likely into volunteer battalions—efforts that were
largely shelved during the “partial mobilization.”[5] Russia will likely struggle to fill out new “volunteer”
units rapidly following the reserve call-ups and the flight of hundreds of thousands of Russians who
feared those call-ups. Continued attempts to create “volunteer” units will thus likely generate little
meaningful combat power and will be spread over an extended period of time.
The Russian military will begin its semi-annual conscription call-up a month later than usual on
November 1, 2022. Russia’s conscription cycle offers a set of predictable timelines. Normal Russian
conscript training involves a period of roughly six months of individual basic and advanced training
followed by the assignment of conscripts to combat units in which they complete their remaining six
months of mandatory service.[6] Russian law bans sending conscripts to combat operations abroad with
fewer than four months of training, although it specifies that conditions of war or martial law allow the
Russian military to deploy conscripts to fight earlier than that. Putin has declared martial law states of
varying degrees of urgency throughout the Russian Federation and could use that declaration to trigger
the exemption from the mandatory training period.[7] The annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts offers
