https://crsreports.congress.gov
Updated November 14, 2022
Defense Primer: What Is Command and Control?
The Department of Defense (DOD) defines command and
control (C2) as “[t]he exercise of authority and direction by
a properly designated commander over assigned forces in
the accomplishment of the mission.” At its most
fundamental level, C2 represents how DOD makes
operational decisions. One can view C2 through the context
of five variables: who, what, when, where, and how (see
Figure 1). Traditionally, Congress has focused on the
authorities (the “who”) and technology (the “how”)
variables, and less so on the force mix (“what”), temporal
(“when”), and geographic (“where”). China and Russia
have developed strategies to disrupt or potentially deny
DOD its ability to make decisions; as a result, DOD is
modernizing systems and processes to command and
control military forces.
Figure 1. C2 Conceptual Model
Source: Congressional Research Service.
The first variable that Congress has traditionally focused on
reflects the authority a commander has to execute an
operation. This line of discussion focuses on the chain of
command, reflecting the differences between the military
services—charged with organizing, training, and equipping
U.S. forces (e.g., the Army provides infantry battalions and
the Air Force creates fighter squadrons)—and the
combatant commands who decide what those units should
do and give them orders. This variable can be summarized
by the question: “who commands forces?”
The second variable represents the hardware and systems
that enable commanders to make these decisions and
transmit them to the field. Terms like command, control,
communications (C3), C3 plus computers (C4),
and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
enter the discussion. This technical dimension of command
and control looks at the data (and method of collection) that
commanders use to make decisions (i.e., ISR is the data to
enable decisionmaking), the processing power to transform
data into information (the computer element), and the
systems that enable commanders to communicate their
decisions to geographically distributed forces. This
technical approach to command and control can be
summarized as, “how do you command forces?”
Other variables of command and control answer separate
questions: which systems and units are being commanded
(“what”), the temporal aspect (“when”), and geography
(“where”). Congress has historically expressed interest in
each of these variables in the context of specific, rather than
general, issues. For example, rather than considering
general purpose forces, Congress has focused on issues
regarding nuclear forces and authorities associated with
special operations (“What forces are being commanded?”).
Regarding the “when,” Congress has expressed interest in
command and control associated with quick response to
nuclear and cyber operations, and to a limited extent in
terms of electromagnetic spectrum operations. However, a
sensitivity on “when” generally is more tactically focused
(e.g., when to have aircraft on target, when an assault on a
building should begin); these decisions are often delegated
to operational commanders.
The geographic component (“where”) presents unique
challenges for commanding U.S. forces. Congress and the
executive branch traditionally explore and debate these
issues through the lens of the National Security Strategy.
This debate focuses on the U.S. role in the world and the
locations and interests of its rivals, as well as potentially
discussing authorization of the use of military forces.
What are strategic competitors doing?
Key strategic competitors identified in the 2022 National
Defense Strategy (NDS), like China and Russia, have
observed U.S. military operations for the past 30 years,
noting that disrupting C2 systems could be one cost-
effective solution to mitigating U.S. military advantages. As
a result, potential adversaries have developed systems and
strategies to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. command and
control systems.
China’s military strategy has been informed by the concept
of “systems confrontation,” which is similar to the U.S.
concepts of sharing information with multiple systems. The
systems confrontation concept assumes that victory in
modern warfare does not necessarily require annihilation of
adversary forces on the battlefield, but instead can be
achieved by paralyzing major operational systems, such as
command and control or logistics. To this end, China’s
military modernization has emphasized developing—for
example—the ability to reduce the effectiveness of
adversary satellites and communications systems and thus
prevent adversary forces from connecting weapons systems
