1
National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1996, H.Rept. 104-450, p. 57.
2
National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1999, S.Rept. 105-189, p. 154.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code RS21921
Updated May 2, 2005
Cruise Missile Defense
Ravi R. Hichkad and Christopher Bolkcom
Research Associate and Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Congress has expressed interest in cruise missile defense for years. Cruise missiles
(CMs) are essentially unmanned attack aircraft — vehicles composed of an airframe,
propulsion system, guidance system, and weapons payload. They may possess highly
complex navigation and targeting systems and thus have the capability to sustain low,
terrain-hugging flight paths as well as strike with great accuracy. CMs can be launched
from numerous platforms — air-, land-, or sea-based — and they can be outfitted with
either conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Department
of Defense is pursuing several initiatives that seek to improve capabilities against an
unpredictable cruise missile threat. These initiatives compete for funding and
congressional attention. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Background
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY1996 called on the Department of
Defense (DOD) to embark upon an initiative to develop cruise missile defense (CMD)
programs emphasizing operational efficiency and affordability. Advanced cruise missiles
(CMs) — those designed with stealthy capabilities to evade detection — were noted as
a prominent threat prompting the need for effective CMD. This CMD initiative was to
be well coordinated with other air defense efforts; that is, with “cruise missile defense
programs ... and ballistic missile defense programs ... mutually supporting” each other.
1
Three years later, in conjunction with the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY1999, the Senate Armed Services Committee noted: “[T]he committee does not believe
that the Department of Defense has adequately integrated its various cruise missile
defense programs into a coherent architecture and development plan.”
2
DOD has indicated a commitment to developing CMD capabilities — within its
larger strategy of air defense requirements — that demonstrate operational effectiveness.
Unlike past approaches to CMD that critics assert were “stovepiped” — individually
driven by the Services’ respective objectives — current and future programs are meant
