https://crsreports.congress.gov
Updated November 21, 2022
Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)
As an operational concept, Multi-Domain Operations
(MDO) influence what types of weapon systems and
equipment the Army procures, what types and numbers of
soldiers are needed, the organizational structure of the
Army, and what type of training is required—all significant
legislative congressional concerns. As such, an
understanding of MDO could prove beneficial for
congressional oversight activities.
What Are Multi-Domain Operations
(MDO)?
According to the Army’s Field Manual (FM) Operations
dated October 1, 2022:
Multi-Domain Operations are the combined arms
employment of joint and Army capabilities to create
and exploit relative advantages that achieve
objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate
gains on behalf of joint force commanders.
Employing Army and joint capabilities makes use
of all available combat power from each domain to
accomplish missions at least cost.
Multi-Domain Operations are the Army’s
contribution to joint campaigns, spanning the
competition continuum. Below the threshold of
armed conflict, multi-domain operations are how
Army forces accrue advantages and demonstrate
readiness for conflict, deterring adversaries while
assuring allies and partners. During conflict, they
are how Army forces close with and destroy the
enemy, defeat enemy formations, seize critical
terrain, and control populations and resources to
deliver sustainable political outcomes.
Why Did the Army Adopt MDO?
MDO is described in a December 2018 Army publication,
The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028. The
Army developed MDO in response to the 2018 National
Defense Strategy which shifted the previous focus of U.S.
national security from countering violent extremists
worldwide to confronting revisionist powers—primarily
Russia and China—that are said to “want to shape a world
consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto
authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and
security decisions.” According to The U.S. Army in Multi-
Domain Operations 2028:
China and Russia exploit the conditions of the
operational environment to achieve their objectives
without resorting to armed conflict by fracturing the
U.S.’s alliances, partnerships, and resolve. They
attempt to create stand-off through the integration
of diplomatic and economic actions,
unconventional and information warfare (social
media, false narratives, cyber-attacks), and the
actual or threatened employment of conventional
forces. By creating instability within countries and
alliances, China and Russia create political
separation that results in strategic ambiguity
reducing the speed of friendly recognition, decision,
and reaction. Through these competitive actions,
China and Russia believe they can achieve
objectives below the threshold of armed conflict.
How the Army Intends to Compete
Arguably, competition is a critical aspect of MDO because
if conducted successfully, conflict might be avoided.
According to U.S. Army Chief of Staff Paper #2, The Army
in Military Competition, dated March 1, 2021, the Army
competes in three ways:
Narrative competition is reflected in the rise and fall of a
country’s reputation based on general perceptions of its
strength, reliability, and resolve. The Army contributes by
being a lethal, competent, credible force and being
recognized as such by allies, partners, and adversaries.
Direct competition encompasses the full range of
competitive activities, from the lowest intensity competition
below armed conflict through general state conflict. In
direct competition, the objective is to create leverage for the
United States and to deny leverage to adversaries.
Indirect competition’s objective is to gain advantage (or
deny it to the adversary). This objective is in contrast to the
more forceful concept of leverage in direct competition.
The Army contributes by offering a range of credible
options for policymakers.
Some of these options include overseas exercises, security
cooperation, security force assistance, military-to-military
exchanges, overseas basing, intelligence sharing, and
disaster relief. In this regard, indirect competition is not a
“new” operational concept but instead a “re-designation” of
traditional activities short of armed conflict. Army
leadership believes that if the Army and the other Services
prevail in these “competitions,” U.S. national security
objectives should be achieved.
How MDO Is Intended to Work
The Army’s central idea is to prevail by competing
successfully in all domains short of conflict, thereby
deterring a potential enemy. If deterrence fails, Army and
Joint forces are to:
Penetrate enemy anti-access and area denial (A2/AD)
systems (layered and integrated long-range precision-strike
systems, littoral anti-ship capabilities, air defenses, and
long-range artillery and rocket systems) to enable strategic
and operational maneuver of U.S. forces.
