Institute for the Study of War &
The Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Riley Bailey, Angela Howard, Madison Williams, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
December 31, 2022 7:45 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Note: ISW and CTP will not publish a campaign assessment (or maps) tomorrow, January 1, in observance of
the New Year's Holiday. Coverage will resume on Monday, January 2.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annual New Year’s Eve address continued to illustrate that
Putin is uncertain of his ability to shape the Russian information space and remains focused on
justifying the war and its costs to his people. Putin stated that “Russia’s sovereign, independent, and
secure future depends only on us, on our strength and determination” and that 2022 “was a year of difficult,
necessary decisions, of important steps toward achieving the full sovereignty of Russia and the powerful
consolidation of our society.”
He added that the events of 2022 “became the milestone that laid the foundation
of our new common future, our new true independence.” He continued: “That is what we are fighting for even
today, we are defending our people on our own historical territories in the new Russian Federation Subjects [the
illegally annexed territories of Ukraine].” This speech continued Putin’s rhetorical claims not only that Russia
has historical rights to Ukraine, but also that Russia’s independence and sovereignty depend on regaining control
of Ukraine. Putin thereby attempts to cast victory in the war as essential to Russia’s continued existence as an
independent state.
These comments were likely meant in part to justify the costly war and to appeal to the ultra-nationalist pro-war
community that routinely cites the defense of illegally annexed territories as a reason to pursue even more
aggressive goals and to pay even higher prices for them in Ukraine.
They also indicate, however, that Putin
remains unwilling to contemplate a meaningful peaceful resolution of the war he began other than on terms he
dictates to Ukraine and the West. Putin is unlikely to accept any lesser outcome unless Ukraine, with the help of
its Western supporters, can inflict additional large-scale defeats on Russian forces and liberate considerably
more of its occupied land.
Putin did not use his annual speech to make any announcements about how the Russian military intends to
reverse its setbacks in Ukraine and achieve his maximalist goals. The banality of most of the speech is consistent
with previous ISW assessments that Vladimir Putin may have postponed his annual address to the Russian
Federation Assembly because he was uncertain of his ability to shape the Russian information space amidst
increasing criticism of his conduct of the war.
Putin delivered his address from the headquarters of the Southern Military District (SMD) as
part of an ongoing effort to portray himself as an effective wartime leader actively in control of
the war effort. Putin delivered his address from the Southern Military District in Rostov-on-Don with Russian
military personnel in combat uniforms behind him.
Putin also reportedly presented battle banners to the
Donetsk People‘s Republic (DNR) 1
st
Army Corps and the Luhansk People’s Republic 2
nd
Army Corps, as well as
state awards to Russian servicemembers who participated in combat missions in Ukraine.
Russian sources
reported that Putin also awarded the Cross of Saint George to the commander of the Russian Armed Forces in
Ukraine, Army General Sergey Surovikin.
Putin likely staged these events at the SMD headquarters to bolster
Kremlin efforts to portray Putin as being deeply involved in the conduct of the war and an effective wartime
leader.
The award to Surovikin signals Putin’s continued support of the overall commander of the war despite
the fact that Surovikin‘s tenure has not yet seen any significant territorial gains and the fact that the wide-scale
