1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 2
George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angela Howard, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W.
Kagan
January 2, 7 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Ukrainian air defenses reportedly intercepted all drones from two consecutive nights of Russian drone
strike attacks against Ukraine on December 31 – January 2. Ukraine’s air force reported on January 1 that
Ukrainian air defense forces shot down all 45 Russian Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones that Russia fired at Ukraine on New
Year's Eve.[1] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesman Yuriy Ignat stated on January 1 that Ukrainian forces used the US-provided
NASAMS air defense system to shoot down these drones.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 2 that
Ukrainian forces intercepted all 39 Shahed-136 drones launched against Ukraine between the night of January 1 and
2.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff again reported on January 2 that Ukrainian forces shot down all 27 Shahed-136 drones
that Russian forces launched against Ukraine on January 2, though it is unclear if this figure includes the previously reported
intercepts from the night between January 1 and 2.[4] Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR)
Vadym Skibitsky reiterated on January 1 that Russian forces only have enough cruise missiles to conduct two to three more
large-scale missile attacks against Ukraine.[5]
Russia’s air and missile campaign against Ukraine is likely not generating the Kremlin’s desired
information effects among Russia’s nationalists. Russian forces conducted a cruise missile strike against an object
in Khmelnytskyi Oblast — reportedly a base of the Ukrainian 8th Separate Special Forces Regiment — on December 31.[6] A
Russian milblogger stated that the strike, while well-executed and a good information operation, is too little too late.[7] The
blogger argued that Russia needed to systematically conduct such strikes earlier on in the war, that the strike should have
had follow-up strikes to ensure maximum damage, and that the timing of this strike was inopportune since Ukrainian
elements were unlikely to be at the base on New Year’s Eve.[8] The blogger noted that this was not the first time that Russian
forces failed to deliver effective strikes due to an absence of secondary strikes and that Russia should generally be more
thorough in its destruction.[9]
A devastating Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian base in Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast, on December 31
generated significant criticism of Russian military leadership in the Russian information space. The
Ukrainian General Staff reported that a Ukrainian precision strike on a Russian manpower and military equipment
concentration point in Makiivka destroyed up to 10 pieces of equipment but did not release an official casualty number as
of January 2.[10] The Department of Strategic Communications of the Ukrainian Armed Forces stated on January 1 that the
strike killed 400 mobilized personnel and injured 300.[11] Geolocated footage published on January 1 also placed the
aftermath of the strike at the Vocational School No. 19, fewer than 13km east of the frontline.[12] The Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) acknowledged the strike, claiming that four of the six rockets killed 63 Russian servicemen.[13] Samara
Oblast Governor Dmitry Azarov confirmed that among the deceased servicemen are residents of the oblast, and some
Russian sources claimed that 600 servicemen of a mobilization regiment were in the school building at the time of the
strike.[14] Some milbloggers claimed that the death count was about 110, with over 100 wounded personnel.[15]
The Russian MoD is likely attempting to deflect the blame for its poor operational security (OPSEC) onto
Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) officials and mobilized forces. DNR law enforcement officials told Russian state
wires that the strike occurred when Russian servicemen violated operational security by using personal cell phones, allowing
Ukrainian forces to conduct a precision strike at the base.[16] Kremlin-leaning outlets and some milbloggers amplified the
claim, stating that Russian forces should not underestimate the Ukrainian ability to exploit poor OPSEC practices on the
frontlines and called on the Kremlin to introduce stricter guidelines on cell phone use among servicemen.[17] Luhansk
People’s Republic (LNR) Deputy Interior Minister Vitaly Kiselyov amplified milblogger reports that military commanders
are demanding the resignation of DNR Head Denis Pushilin.[18] Some DNR public officials have also called for the
punishment of the official who had decided to use the school.[19] The Russian MoD may have deliberately relied on the
DNR officials to blame OPSEC violations on mobilized servicemen for the attack in an effort to make the DNR the
responsible party.
The Russian MoD’s vague acknowledgment of the strike generated criticism towards the Russian military
command, however. Wagner-affiliated milbloggers stated that Russian military command had made it easy for the
Ukrainian forces to strike several hundred servicemen in one location, calling the DNR explanation of cell phone usage a
“lie.”[20] A former Russian officer had also stated that Russian forces stored ammunition in the school’s basement, enabling
the devastating strike.[21] Other milbloggers stated that the Russian command witnessed similar strikes throughout the
