Institute for the Study of War &
The Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 28
George Barros, Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W.
Kagan
December 28, 8:15pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Russian offensive against Bakhmut is likely culminating as ISW forecasted on
December 27.
US military doctrine defines culmination as the "point at which a force no longer has
the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense,” and “when a force cannot continue
the attack and must assume a defensive posture or execute an operational pause.”
If Russian forces in
Bakhmut have indeed culminated, they may nevertheless continue to attack aggressively. Culminated
Russian forces may continue to conduct ineffective squad-sized assaults against Bakhmut, though these
assaults would be very unlikely to make operationally significant gains.
Several indicators support the assessment that Russian forces around Bakhmut have
culminated.
Senior Ukrainian officials are visiting frontline positions in Bakhmut unimpeded. Ukraine’s Military
Intelligence Directorate (GUR) chief, Kyrylo Budanov, visited Bakhmut on December 27-28 and was
geolocated to within at least 600 meters of the previously recorded Russian forward line of troops.
Budanov’s visit supports previous Ukrainian social media reports that Ukrainian forces conducted a
tactical counterattack that repelled Russian forces from the outskirts of Bakhmut on December 21.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited Bakhmut on December 20.
Recent combat footage supports ISW’s previous assessment that Russian forces are operating in squad-
sized assault groups due to combat losses.
Combat footage posted on December 26 shows Ukrainian
fire defeating squad-sized groups of 5-10 unsupported Russian infantry attempting a disorderedly
assault on Novoselivske in Luhansk Oblast.
This footage, while not from Bakhmut, is consistent with
a senior Ukrainian official’s report that Russian forces in the Bakhmut area are no longer operating as
company and battalion tactical groups but are instead operating in smaller groups of 10 to 15
servicemembers (squad-size organizations) as of December 27.
Russian airborne forces (VDV) are reportedly augmenting Wagner Group operations around Bakhmut.
A Russian source reported that Wagner and VDV elements conducted joint operations in Bakhmut on
December 27.
The report, if true, marks an inflection given that the Wagner Group has been conducting
information operations to assert that the Wagner Group forces exclusively are operating in Bakhmut.
The conventional Russian military supporting Wagner Group elements in Bakhmut—after Wagner took
efforts to emphasize it exclusively is responsible for the Bakhmut sector—would be consistent with
indicators for the Wagner Group forces’ culmination. ISW has previously assessed that Wagner Group
forces are serving a chiefly attritional role around Bakhmut and have therefore likely become degraded
to a near-debilitating extent and need reinforcement from more conventional Russian elements.
High
rates of attrition amongst the forces responsible for the offensive on Bakhmut may expedite the
culmination unless notable numbers of regular Russian military units are sent to sustain the offensive
and delay or avert its culmination.
