Institute for the Study of War &
The Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 23
Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan
December 23, 9:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Moscow has been setting conditions for a new most dangerous course of action
(MDCOA)--a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine possibly aimed at Kyiv--since at least
October 2022.
This MDCOA could be a Russian information operation or could reflect Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s actual intentions. Currently available indicators are ambivalent—some
verified evidence of a Russian buildup in Belarus makes more sense as part of preparations for a
renewed offensive than as part of ongoing exercises and training practices, but there remains no
evidence that Moscow is actively preparing a strike force in Belarus. Concern about the possibility that
Putin might pursue this MDCOA is certainly not merely a Ukrainian information operation intended to
pressure the West into supplying Kyiv with more weapons, as some Western analysts have suggested.
ISW continues to assess that a renewed large-scale Russian invasion from Belarus is unlikely this
winter, but it is a possibility that must be taken seriously.
Prominent Russian pro-war milbloggers are amplifying the possibility of the MDCOA
over the winter-spring period. Former Russian military commander Igor Girkin, a prominent
critical voice in the Russian milblogger space, responded to ongoing discussions within the Russian
information space on December 23 about Russia’s capacity to renew an assault on northwestern
Ukraine from Belarus to sever ground lines of communication (GLOCs) between Kyiv and Europe.
Girkin broke the MDCOA into two possible sub-courses of action: Russia can invade from Belarus in an
effort to capture territory or could alternatively conduct a diversionary operation to draw Ukrainian
forces from other parts of the theater.
Girkin argued that the Russian military could not effectively
conduct an offensive operation to capture territory, but that a diversionary operation to support a
Russian offensive elsewhere in Ukraine would make military sense. Girkin also pointed out that public
discourse about this MDCOA had spread throughout the Russian-language internet and noted that
other prominent milbloggers have hypothesized different scenarios for the MDCOA.
Some milbloggers have been speculating about the likelihood of a renewed Russian attack on northern
Ukraine since at least October 2022. Prominent Russian Telegram channel Rybar, whose author is
currently part of Putin’s mobilization working group, stated on October 20 that there were rumors of
an “imminent” Russian offensive operation on Lviv, Volyn, Kyiv, Chernihiv, or Kharkiv.
Another
milblogger claimed on October 20 that joint forces in Belarus are too small to attack Kyiv but stated
that he would not object if Russian forces attacked Chernihiv City.
Putin’s upcoming meeting with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in St.
Petersburg on December 26-27 will advance the Russian information operation around
the MDCOA even if it does not directly support preparations for it. Lukashenko’s office
announced that Putin and Lukashenko will meet during a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
heads of state meeting in St. Petersburg on December 26-27.
This meeting will advance the Kremlin's
existing information operation about the MDCOA, as Putin's December 19 visit to Minsk did, given the
growing Russian military presence in Belarus.
