Institute for the Study of War &
The Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 21
George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Angela Howard, Layne Philipson,
Madison Williams, and Frederick W. Kagan
December 21, 7:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu presided
over a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Collegium in Moscow on December 21 and
made significant statements pertaining to Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and the
strategic direction of the Russian military.
The Kremlin intensified its information operation accusing NATO expansion of
presenting a military threat to Russia.
Shoigu stated that NATO’s military expansion near
Russian borders, including Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership aspirations, necessitates an
"appropriate" Russian response to establish a Russian force group in northwestern Russia.
Senior
Kremlin officials said that the accession of the Nordic states to NATO would not threaten Russia in
spring 2022. Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that Finland and Sweden joining NATO would
not present an existential threat to Russia in April 2022 and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
stated that Finland and Sweden joining NATO would not make "much difference" in May 2022.
Shoigu publicly presented a series of proposed Russian defense policy changes to
significantly increase the size of the Russian military. Shoigu proposed that Russia reestablish
the Moscow and Leningrad military districts, form a new army corps, and form 17 new maneuver
divisions.
Shoigu suggested that Russia form a new army corps in Karelia, two new airborne assault
divisions, three new motorized rifle divisions in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts, and expand
seven existing brigades of the Northern Fleet and Western, Central, and Eastern Military districts into
seven new motorized rifle divisions while expanding five existing naval infantry brigades into five naval
infantry divisions. Shoigu also proposed that Russia form five artillery divisions to support military
districts.
He proposed increasing the strength of the Russian Armed Forces to 1.5 million servicemen,
including 695,000 contract servicemen (Shoigu said in spring 2021 that 380,000 Russians were
contract servicemen), gradually increasing the age of conscription for military service from 18 to 21
years and raising the age limit for conscripts from 27 to 30 years. Shoigu did not specify a timeline for
these measures.
This is not the first time the Russian MoD has signaled its intention to reverse the 2008 Serdyukov
reforms that largely disbanded Russian ground forces divisions in favor of independent brigades. The
Russian MoD has been steadily reversing the Serdyukov reforms by restoring maneuver divisions
across Russian military districts since 2013.
The Kremlin is very unlikely to form such a large conventional force in a timeline that is
relevant for Russia’s war in Ukraine, however. Forming divisions is costly and takes time. It
took the Russian military over a year to reform the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms
Army) between 2016 and 2017, for example.
Russia was unable to fully staff its existing brigades and
regiments before the full-scale invasion and had not fully built out a new division it announced it was
forming in 2020 before the start of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Russia’s economy is in recession,
