1 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 17
Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, George Barros,
Angela Howard, and Frederick W. Kagan
December 17, 5:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Kremlin is likely attempting to depict Russian President Vladimir Putin as a
competent wartime leader and to rehabilitate the image of the Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) by publicizing Putin’s meeting with the joint headquarters of the Russian
Armed Forces. The Kremlin announced on December 17 that Putin worked at the joint headquarters
of the services of the Russian Armed Forces throughout the day, heard reports on the progress of the
“Special Military Operation” in Ukraine, and held a meeting with the joint headquarters and a separate
meeting with commanders.
1
The Russian MoD and media published footage of the meeting with the
joint headquarters that showed that Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Army
General Valery Gerasimov, Russian Defense Minister Army General Sergei Shoigu, and the Commander
of the Joint Group of Forces in Ukraine Army General Sergei Surovikin were in attendance.
2
Images
and video of the event provided by the Russian MoD preclude the identification of other notable officers
(such as military district or army commanders) present, however. The Kremlin likely publicized the
meeting to present Putin as being thoroughly engaged with the planning and execution of the war in
Ukraine following recent prominent criticism of his role in leading the war effort by figures in the ultra-
nationalist pro-war community.
3
One prominent milblogger even questioned whether “Putin finally
showed public interest in the special military operation” at their suggestion to do so.
4
The Kremlin also likely publicized Putin’s meeting with the joint headquarters to rehabilitate the image
of the Russian MoD in response to the pro-war community’s routine criticism of the Russian MoD. The
Kremlin likely consciously publicized Gerasimov’s, Shoigu’s, and Surovikin’s attendance at the meeting
with Putin to present the Russian MoD as an organized, unified, and effective war-fighting institution
and to shield the top commanders of the Russian Armed Forces from further criticism. The Russian
MoD has taken great care in the past months to affirm Gerasimov’s continued role as Chief of the
General Staff for a similar reason- in the absence of tangible Russian victories against Ukraine, Russian
military leadership seeks to present a picture of a functional and seamless chain of military command.
5
The Kremlin is likely attempting to rehabilitate the image of the Russian MoD to counterbalance the
growing influence of pro-war ultra-nationalist figures, primarily that of Chechen Republic head
Ramzan Kadyrov and Wagner Group Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, and their parallel military
structures. The Kremlin will likely continue to attempt to shield the Russian MoD from criticism while
still facilitating the growing influence of these ultra-nationalist pro-war figures. This effort is
unsustainable and will likely continue to generate conflict between the Russian MoD and the ultra-
nationalist pro-war community.
The Kremlin likely aims to portray Putin as a leader in touch with the Russian people by
publicizing Putin’s participation in meaningless events like the grand opening of a turkey
farm. Independent Russian news outlet The Moscow Times reported that the Kremlin has instructed
leaders of certain state-owned corporations and regional governors to prepare a “positive agenda” of
news and events in which Putin can participate.
6
The Moscow Times noted that Putin’s calendar already
