1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 19
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Madison Williams, and Frederick W. Kagan
December 19, 9:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko likely deflected Russian President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to
coerce Belarus into further Russian-Belarusian integration concessions during a meeting in Minsk on
December 19. Putin and Lukashenko refrained from publicly discussing the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with both
leaders noting that Belarus still faces a Western threat.[1] Putin announced that he may consider training Belarusian combat
aviation crews for the use of “munitions with special warheads” due to the “escalating” situation on the Union State’s
external borders.[2] ISW has previously assessed that Lukashenko uses the rhetoric of defending Belarusian borders against
the West and NATO in an effort to avoid participating in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[3] Lukashenko had also used
similar hints about the possible deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus on February 17 in the context of claimed Western
aggression.[4] Lukashenko noted that Russia will deliver S-400 air defense complexes and Iskander complexes, while Putin
stated that both leaders discussed the formation of a united defense space.[5] ISW continues to assess that Belarus’
participation in Putin’s war against Ukraine remains unlikely. The fact that Putin appears to have accepted Lukashenko’s
talking points without persuading Lukashenko to adjust them indirectly supports this assessment. Lukashenko would likely
adjust his rhetoric to create some plausible explanation to his own people about why he was suddenly turning away from
the fictitious NATO invasion threat he has manufactured to join Putin’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine.
The Kremlin has also attempted to conceal Putin’s likely original intentions to pressure Lukashenko into
further concessions regarding integration with the Russian Federation. Putin notably stated that “Russia is not
interested in absorbing anyone,” when referring to Belarus.[6] This statement followed Lukashenko’s reiteration of
Belarusian independence and full sovereignty on December 16 and appears to be a defensive reaction to Lukashenko’s
comments.[7] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov also stated that Putin did not go to Belarus to convince Lukashenko to
join the war, noting that such speculations are unfounded and “foolish.”[8] Peskov had avidly denied Putin’s intention to
invade Ukraine days before the start of offensive operation in a similar fashion, to be sure, but this denial is more likely an
attempt to cover up Putin’s desperation to involve Lukashenko in the war and apparent failure—again—to do so.
Russian forces targeted Kyiv with Shahed-131 and -136 kamikaze drone strikes overnight on December 18–
19. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 30 Russian Shahed drones, including 10 over southern
Ukraine and 18 over Kyiv.[9] Kyiv City Military Administration Head Serhiy Popko stated that Russian strikes did manage
to hit an unspecified infrastructure object in Kyiv, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian strikes targeted energy
infrastructure.[10] Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov assessed that Russian forces
have enough missiles left to conduct three or four more rounds of strikes and then would have to acquire more missiles from
Iran, which Ukraine would struggle to defend against; but he noted that Ukrainian forces know how to defend against
Shahed kamikaze drones.[11] Russian milbloggers continued to criticize Russian forces for striking operationally
insignificant targets that do not forward Russia’s military goals in Ukraine.[12]
Igor Girkin, a former Russian militant commander and prominent critical voice in the Russian milblogger
information space, shared a Russian volunteer’s harsh critique of the Russian military’s overall
performance in the war on December 19.[13] The volunteer framed his critique around Russian failures to defend
against Ukrainian counteroffensives; the circumstances that led to those failures; and Russian leadership, media, and
milbloggers’ failure to address the situations and decision to focus on false positivity.[14] Girkin himself has been a profound
critic of the Kremlin and Russia’s military failures, especially following his claimed two-month stint fighting in Ukraine, as
ISW has previously reported.[15] The volunteer forecasted that Russian forces will have to surrender more cities and even
full oblasts to Ukraine as they will be unable to defend against a possible winter counteroffensive, and Girkin’s amplification
of such a forecast suggests he may agree with it. Girkin’s own extremely pessimistic forecasts have been surprisingly
accurate, including his critiques of the failure to effectively generate Russian military volunteers in May that has carried
over to current mobilization efforts, of the disproportionately high Russian price paid for the limited gain of the capture of
Lysychansk in July, and of Russian logistics lines’ continued vulnerability to HIMARS strikes across the theater.[16] Other
prominent Russian milbloggers largely ignored the rant that Girkin amplified on December 19 (unlike Girkin's own
December 6 rant following his return to Russia and Telegram), instead continuing to report on Russian activity around
Bakhmut in the same performative nature that portrays operationally insignificant gains as huge victories—a framing that
the volunteer’s rant spent hundreds of words condemning.[17]
The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) is reportedly clashing with other pro-Russian authorities about
basic administrative functions, suggesting a lack of cohesion between occupation administrations
