Institute for the Study of War &
The Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 14
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, George Barros, Riley Bailey, Madison Williams,
and Frederick W. Kagan
December 14, 7:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s alluded decision to postpone his annual address to
the Russian Federation Assembly indicates he remains uncertain of his ability to shape
the Russian information space amidst increasing criticism of his conduct of the invasion
of Ukraine. The Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly to the Russian State Duma and
Federation Council is an annual speech introduced to the Russian constitution in February 1994,
roughly equivalent to the US President’s annual State of the Union address. Kremlin Spokesperson
Dmitry Peskov stated that Putin may deliver his address to the Federation Assembly in 2023 and called
on Russians to stop "fortune-telling with coffee grounds" regarding the timing of the next address.
An
unnamed government source told the Russian state newswire TASS that the countdown for the new
address starts from the date of the previous address, noting that the address is unlikely to take place in
2022.
Putin held his last address in late April 2021, discussing his initiatives for the year following the
first crisis he caused with the Russian military buildup on the Ukrainian border in early 2021.
The Russian withdrawal from Kyiv Oblast and northern Ukraine in April 2022 likely
spoiled Putin’s plans to declare victory during the Federation Assembly address. Putin
had previously seized the opportunity in March 2014 to deliver the "Crimean Speech," wherein he
announced the illegal annexation of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.
Putin likely anticipated a similar
outcome in early spring only to indefinitely postpone the address, likely as a result of Russian military
failures, his announced annexation of territories Russian forces did not control, and public
dissatisfaction with mobilization. Putin may be still waiting and hoping to deliver a grandiose victory
speech in 2023 or postponing the moment when he will have to admit that Russia cannot achieve his
frequently restated maximalist aims in Ukraine.
Putin may not be confident in his ability to justify the cost of his war upon Russian
domestic and global affairs when addressing the Russian public and elites. The unnamed
TASS source noted that the address requires significant preparation by the president and his staff as it
normally addresses plans for all aspects of Russian society—economy, education, military, global
partnerships, etc. A victory in Ukraine could have allowed Putin to obfuscate Russian human and
financial losses as it did in 2014, but Russia has not had any significant victories since the Russian
occupation of Lysychansk in early July. Putin had previously attempted to sell the annexation of
partially occupied Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts on September 30 as a major
victory, only to reportedly generate further grumbling among Russian elites and undermine state
propaganda narratives.
Putin’s most recent appearances on December 7 and December 9 offered vague
responses to a few concerns over the length of the war, a second mobilization wave, and a claimed
Ukrainian threat to Russian territory but also generated some criticism and confusion within the
Russian pro-war community.
The Russian withdrawal from Kherson City had also angered prominent
nationalist ideologists who had begun to question Putin’s commitment and ability to establish "Greater
Russia."
