1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 12
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, George Barros, Madison
Williams, Yekaterina Klepanchuk, and Frederick W. Kagan
December 12, 7 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian forces are continuing to shape and consolidate their force composition in eastern Ukraine to
bolster defenses against ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensives near the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border
and support limited offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast. An independent Ukrainian analytical organization, the
Center for Defense Strategies, noted on December 12 that the Russians are centralizing and systematizing the command and
control of Western Military District (WMD) troops in the Kharkiv-Luhansk direction.[1] The Center noted that the 20th
Combined Arms Army of the WMD is currently operating in this area in three general groupings: elements of the 144th
Motorized Rifle Division near Svatove; elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division on the Kreminna-Rubizhne line; and
elements of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division of the 11th Army Corps in northwestern Luhansk Oblast near Troitske.[2] The
Center also reported that elements of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps (troops of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics,
respectively), 76th Air Assault Division and 106th Airborne Division, and up to three BARS (Combat Reserve) detachments,
amounting up to 15 to 17 battalions, are concentrated in this general area.[3] These troop concentrations are likely
significantly degraded and understrength.
ISW has previously observed WMD elements operating throughout Kharkiv Oblast prior to the sweeping Ukrainian
counteroffensives in September that ultimately drove Russian troops back to the current line along the Kharkiv-Luhansk
Oblast border.[4] Russian and Ukrainian reporting has additionally suggested that there is a high concentration of mobilized
personnel operating on this axis, likely in order to fill gaps in WMD units that have been degraded over the course of ongoing
Ukrainian counteroffensives in northeastern Ukraine.[5] BARS-13 and BARS-16 detachments have been particularly active
along the Svatove-Kreminna line.[6] Elements of the Central Military District (CMD) have previously been observed in the
Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area.[7] The observation that elements of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) are operating in
Luhansk Oblast suggests that they redeployed away from the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast, where ISW previously
reported they were operating prior to the massive Russian withdrawal from the right bank.[8] The current force composition
of the Russian contingent in eastern Kherson is unclear. Elements of the Russian Southern Military District (SMD) likely
maintain a presence in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts.[9]
Wagner Group fighters, supported by elements of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps, are largely responsible for driving offensive
operations in Donetsk Oblast, particularly around Bakhmut and the western outskirts of Donetsk City. ISW has previously
reported the role of Wagner Group forces in securing minor gains around Bakhmut over the last few months.[10] Troops of
the 6th Regiment of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 2nd Army Corps have been active northeast of Bakhmut in the
Soledar area.[11] ISW has additionally observed the prevalence of groupings of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 1st
Army Corps in the Donetsk City–Avdiivka area, particularly the “Sparta” and “Somalia” battalions, which have claimed gains
along the western outskirts of Donetsk City in areas such as Pisky, Vodiane, and Marinka. DNR elements have notably been
active in this area since 2014. Russian sources reported that DNR troops, elements of the Russian Eastern Military District
(EMD), and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade and 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet were responsible
for costly offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City in the Vuhledar-Pavlivka area in November.[12]
The cost of the Russian war in Ukraine will likely continue to undermine Russian President Vladimir
Putin’s geopolitical campaigns worldwide. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on December 11 that Putin
signed a law allocating over nine trillion rubles (approximately $143 billion) for defense, security, and law enforcement for
the 2023 budget. That amount is about 8 percent of Russia’s 2021 gross domestic product according to the World
Bank.[13] The UK MoD assessed that Russia’s defense spending significantly increased and will represent over 30% of
Russia’s entire 2023 budget.[14] Putin is thus continuing to drain his budget into his war in Ukraine and may need to defund
other international or domestic campaigns in the process. ISW has long assessed that Russian forces have been moving
equipment and personnel from other conflict zones such as Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh and may deprioritize other combat
and soft-power engagements in favor of sustaining a protracted war in Ukraine.[15]
Putin is seemingly still unwilling to sacrifice his geopolitical initiatives in the short-term, however, and risks facing a
financial predicament in which he will not be able to balance maximalist goals in Ukraine with his global power projection
campaigns. Putin, for example, has continued attempts to reestablish Russia’s position in Central Asia by unsuccessfully
proposing to create a trilateral union among Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan in late November and during a meeting of
the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on December 9.[16] Putin’s continued spending on
