俄罗斯进攻性战役评估,2022年12月11日

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan
December 11, 9 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map
is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, December 11. This report
discusses how the Belarusian regime’s support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine
as well as Russian pressure on Belarus to become more involved further constrains
Belarusian readiness and willingness to enter the war in Ukraine.
Russian officials consistently conduct information operations suggesting that
Belarusian conventional ground forces might join Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Belarusian leaders including Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko sometimes play along
with these information operations. The purpose of these efforts is to pin Ukrainian forces at the
Belarusian border to prevent them from reinforcing Ukrainian operations elsewhere in the
theater. Belarus is extraordinarily unlikely to invade Ukraine in the foreseeable
future whatever the course of these information operations. A Belarusian
intervention in Ukraine, moreover, would not be able to do more than draw
Ukrainian ground forces away from other parts of the theater temporarily given the
extremely limited effective combat power at Minsk’s disposal.
The Kremlin’s efforts to pressure Belarus to support the Russian offensive
campaign in Ukraine are a part of a long-term effort to cement further control over
Belarus. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin intensified pressure on Belarusian President
Alexander Lukashenko to formalize Belarus’ integration into the Union State following the
Belarusian 2020 and 2021 protests.
1
Russia particularly sought to establish permanent military
basing in Belarus and direct control of the Belarusian military.
2
Russia has routinely tried to
leverage its influence over Belarusian security and military affairs to place pressure on Belarus to
support its invasion of Ukraine.
3
ISW assessed that Russian Minister of Defense Army General
Sergei Shoigu meet with Lukashenko on December 3 to further strengthen bilateral security ties
- likely in the context of the Russian-Belarusian Union State - and increase Russian pressure on
Belarus to further support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
4
The Belarusian regime’s support for the Russian invasion has made Belarus a
cobelligerent in the war in Ukraine. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko offered
Belarusian territory to Russian forces for the initial staging of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in
February 2022.
5
Belarusian territory offered critical ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to
the Russian Armed Forces in their failed drive on Kyiv and their subsequent withdrawal from
northern Ukraine.
6
ISW has previously assessed that Belarus materially supports Russian
offensives in Ukraine and provides Russian forces with secure territory and airspace from which
to attack Ukraine with high-precision weapons.
7
Belarusian support for Russia’s war in Ukraine is likely degrading the Belarusian
military’s material capacity to conduct conventional military operations of its own.
The Belarusian open-source Hajun Project reported on November 14 that the Belarusian military
transferred 122 T-72A tanks to Russian forces, likely under the guise of sending them for
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