Institute for the Study of War &
The Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 7
Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, George Barros, Madison Williams, Yekaterina Klepanchuk,
and Frederick W. Kagan
December 7, 7:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is setting conditions for a protracted war of conquest
in Ukraine. During a meeting with the Russian Presidential Council for the Development of Civil
Society and Human Rights (HRC), Putin remarked that the “special operation” in Ukraine can be a
“lengthy process” and that the acquisition of new territory is a significant result of this process for
Russia.
Putin compared himself favorably with Russian Tsar Peter the Great by noting that Russia now
controls the Sea of Azov, which Peter the Great also fought for.
This invocation of Russian imperial
history explicitly frames Putin’s current goals in Ukraine as overtly imperialistic and still maximalist.
Putin is conditioning Russian domestic audiences to expect a protracted, grinding war in Ukraine that
continues to seek the conquest of additional Ukrainian territory.
The Russian information space responded positively to Putin’s assertions and set further conditions for
the protraction of the war, with one milblogger comparing Ukraine to Syria and noting that Russian
forces did not start meaningfully experiencing victories on the battlefield until years into the operation.
ISW has previously observed that the Kremlin has been setting information conditions for the
protraction of the war in Ukraine since the summer following Russian forces’ dismal failures to secure
and retain their primary objectives.
This informational conditioning is fundamentally incompatible
with any discussions regarding a ceasefire or negotiations. Putin seems unwilling to risk losing domestic
momentum by halting his offensive operations even briefly, let alone to pursue an off-ramp short of his
full objectives, which, as he is making increasingly clear, appear to include the reconstitution of the
Russian Empire in some form.
Putin notably is using the Russian HRC as a means to consolidate political power in a
way that is fundamentally incompatible with basic principles of international human
rights law. As ISW previously reported, Putin changed the composition of the HRC on November 17,
removing Russian human rights activists who were critical of Kremlin censorship and installing
political and proxy officials as well as a prominent Russian military correspondent.
The use of a
domestic human rights body to advocate and set conditions for the perpetuation of a genocidal war in
Ukraine undermines statements made by the Kremlin on Russia’s purported commitment to human
rights. Putin’s comment accusing the West of using human rights to violate state sovereignty
undermines a central premise of the international effort to protect human rights.
Putin reiterated Russia’s formal position on the use of nuclear weapons in a statement
to the Russian HRC on December 7 with no noteworthy changes. Putin claimed that the threat
of nuclear war is growing, but that Russia will not be the first to employ nuclear weapons.
Putin added,
however, that if Russia is not the first to initiate the first use of nuclear weapons, it will also not be the
second to do so, because the “possibility of using [a nuclear weapon] in the event of a nuclear strike on
[Russian] territory are very limited.”
Putin reiterated that Russian nuclear doctrine is premised on
self-defense and stated that any Russian nuclear use would be retaliatory. Putin also emphasized that
Russia is not “crazy” and is acutely aware of the power of nuclear weapons but will not “brandish” them.
