1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 8
Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Yekaterina Klepanchuk, Madison
Williams, and Frederick W. Kagan
December 8, 6:40 PM ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz stated that the risk of Russian nuclear escalation is currently low,
partially supporting ISW’s previous assessments. Scholtz stated that “Russia stopped threatening to use nuclear
weapons” because an international "red line” contributed to "putting a stop" to Russian nuclear escalation threats on
December 8.[1] ISW has always assessed that Russian nuclear escalation in Ukraine was unlikely.[2] Russian President
Vladimir Putin reiterated Russia’s official position on nuclear weapons, including Russia’s non-first-use policy, on
December 7.[3] Both Scholtz’s and Putin’s statements support ISW’s previous assessment that while Russian officials may
engage in forms of nuclear saber-rattling as part of an information operation meant to undermine Western support for
Ukraine, Russian officials have no intention of actually using them on the battlefield.[4]
The Kremlin likely has not abandoned its maximalist objectives in Ukraine despite Kremlin Spokesman
Dmitry Peskov’s first-time acknowledgement that Moscow’s current territorial objective is to fully seize
four partially occupied Ukrainian oblasts. Peskov took an opportunity to further capitalize on the Western desire for
negotiations on December 8 when expanding upon Russian President Vladimir Putin’s December 7 remarks regarding the
acquisition of “new Russian territories.”[5] Peskov stated that one of the main goals of the Russian “special military
operation” in Ukraine was to “protect residents of southeastern Ukraine and Donbas” when responding to a journalist‘s
question regarding the Kremlin’s original objectives for war.[6] Peskov also noted that there are no talks about annexing
new territories that are currently not under Russian partial occupation as there is “still a lot of work to be done” to fully
occupy Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Peskov, however, reiterated that the Kremlin is still pursuing
its “demilitarization” and “denazification” objectives in Ukraine, which confirm that Russia is still pursuing regime change
(“denazification”) and the elimination of Ukraine’s ability to resist future Russian attacks or pressure (“demilitarization”).
The Kremlin’s objectives, in other words, continue to remain unchanged from those set following the Russian withdrawal
from around Kyiv. Peskov’s comments were not an inflection in Russian war aims or demands.
Putin’s invocation of Russian imperial history on December 7 and his recent remarks regarding Russia’s role as the only
“guarantee of Ukrainian sovereignty” are further indicators that the Kremlin is setting conditions for a protracted war aimed
at eradicating Ukrainian sovereignty.[7] The Kremlin’s deliberately inconsistent messaging is part of a
persistent information operation intended to mislead the West into pushing Kyiv to negotiate and to offer
preemptive concessions.[8]
The Kremlin’s Western-oriented messaging is continuing to anger the pro-war milblogger community that
is increasingly accusing the Kremlin of deviating from its original war goals in Ukraine, however. A
prominent milblogger stated that “the annexation of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts was not among the declared goals of
the special military operation on February 24.”[9] Less prominent milbloggers claimed that Putin does not have the capacity
to continue pursuing his maximalist goals following numerous withdrawals and unsuccessful offensive campaigns, forcing
the Kremlin to accept protracted war as the means to wear down Ukraine.[10] The Kremlin’s deliberately inconsistent
rhetoric may have further ramifications on the appeal to Russians of Putin’s vision for the war in Ukraine.
Putin may be deliberately distancing his rhetoric from nationalists’ unrealistic demands for the Russian
war efforts in Ukraine. Putin stated on December 8 that in order to help Russia complete its war goals Russians should
stop engaging in confrontations on the information front and suppress their impulses to believe fake and leaked
information.[11] Putin added that there is “a lot of noise” within the information space regarding Russia’s missile campaign
against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and falsely implied that Russian strikes are retaliatory measures following the
claimed Ukrainian attack on Kerch Strait Bridge, shelling of the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant, and Ukraine’s uninterest in
providing water to Donetsk City. A prominent milblogger — who had been calling on Putin to retaliate for Ukraine’s
liberation of Russian-occupied territories and claimed Ukrainian strikes against Russia — found Putin’s comments
disappointing and angrily interpreted Putin’s statements to mean that the Kremlin had not planned to strike Ukrainian
infrastructure if the attack against Kerch Strait Bridge did not occur.[12]
The Kremlin has been increasingly attempting to reorient public opinion to favor its official messaging, and Putin’s
December 8 statement may aim to diminish or marginalize the milbloggers to re-establish the perception that the Kremlin
