Institute for the Study of War &
The Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 6
Angela Howard, Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Madison
Williams, Yekaterina Klepanchuk, and Frederick W. Kagan
December 6, 8:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Kremlin directly responded to Russian rumors of a second wave of mobilization in
an apparent effort to manage growing societal concern and recentralize information
about the war with the Russian government and its authorized outlets. Kremlin Press
Secretary Dmitry Peskov on December 6 urged Russians to rely on communications from the Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the president and to ignore the “provocative messages” published on
social media platforms such as Telegram regarding a second wave of mobilization.
Peskov’s statement
is likely aimed at discrediting the growing influence of both Russian opposition and pro-war Telegram
channels that have been consistently reporting on indicators of the Kremlin’s intention to resume
mobilization in 2023.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is also increasing measures to prevent
mobilized men and their families from complaining about mobilization problems. Putin, for example,
signed a law banning rallies in government buildings, universities, schools, hospitals, ports, train
stations, churches, and airports—likely to suppress riots and protests among mobilized men and their
families.
The Kremlin seems to be departing from the limited war messaging it has been using to
reduce concerns among the general Russian public about the war, likely in an effort to
condition the public for future mobilization waves. Belgorod and Kursk oblasts have
announced the formation of territorial defense units, exposing many civilians to the war under the
absurd premise of the threat of a Ukrainian ground assault on Russia’s border regions.
ISW previously
reported that Kremlin propagandists have started propounding similar implausible theories about a
Ukrainian ground threat to Russian territory.
Moscow officials even plastered advertisements for the
special military operation throughout the city, which ISW has previously observed only in remote cities
and settlements during the summer of 2022 amidst Russia’s volunteer recruitment campaigns.
However, these information conditions are likely insufficient to convince the Russian population at
large of the necessity for additional mobilization given the underwhelming response to volunteer
recruitment advertisement efforts over the summer. The Kremlin risks further harming its credibility
by announcing mobilization that has been predicted by unofficial sources but not discussed by Russian
officials. Russian officials face major challenges balancing Russian force generation needs, which
require the enthusiastic support of the milblogger community, and control of the Russian information
space.
Putin’s decision to order a second wave of mobilization, general mobilization, or even
announce a formal declaration of war with Ukraine will not fix the inherent constraints
on Russian military power available for the war in Ukraine in the short term. The Russian
MoD can only simultaneously train about 130,000 conscripts during a bi-annual conscription cycle in
peacetime and has struggled painfully to prepare a larger number of mobilized men over a shorter
period.
The Ukrainian Commander of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi, noted
that Russian mobilized men who are now arriving at the frontlines are better trained than those
mobilized men who had arrived at the frontlines immediately after Putin’s partial mobilization order
