Institute for the Study of War &
The Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 4
George Barros, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Layne Philipson, Angela
Howard, and Frederick W. Kagan
December 4, 6:15pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Ukrainian officials have indicated that Ukrainian forces plan to continue offensive
operations over the coming winter to capitalize on recent battlefield successes and
prevent Russian forces from regaining the battlefield initiative. Spokesperson of the
Ukrainian Armed Forces Eastern Group Serhii Cherevatyi stated on December 4 that frozen ground
enables heavy wheeled and tracked vehicles to advance and that Ukrainian forces are preparing such
vehicles for winter operations.
Cherevatyi also stated that low-quality mobilized recruits and Wagner
Group personnel recruited from Russian prisoners are unprepared for combat in the winter.
The
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on November 20 that those who suggest the winter will
pause hostilities “likely never sunbathed in January on the southern coast of Crimea,” suggesting that
Ukrainian forces intend to continue counteroffensive operations over the coming winter that contribute
toward the goal of retaking Crimea.
Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Volodymyr Havrylov stated
on November 18 that Ukrainian forces will continue to fight in the winter because any type of pause will
allow Russian forces to reinforce their units and positions.
Ukrainian officials’ prior statements on
ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive actions in Kherson Oblast are further evidence that these official
statements on winter counteroffensive actions are indicators of continuing counteroffensive
operations.
Senior US government officials are mistakenly identifying the optimal window of
opportunity for Ukraine to conduct more counteroffensives as the spring rather than
winter, despite Ukrainian officials’ statements to the contrary. US Director for National
Intelligence (DNI) Avril Haines assessed on December 3 that the pace of the war in Ukraine will slow
over the winter so both sides can refit, resupply, and reconstitute, despite evidence that conditions on
the ground favor a renewed offensive and despite the demonstrated tendency of Ukrainian forces to
initiate new counteroffensive efforts relatively quickly after the previous effort has culminated.
Ukraine’s ability to maintain the military initiative and continue the momentum of its
current operational successes depends on Ukrainian forces continuing to conduct
successive operations through the winter of 2022-2023. Russia lost the initiative in summer
2022 after its offensive in Donbas culminated.
Ukrainian forces gained and have retained the initiative
since August 2022 and have been conducting a series of successful successive operations since then:
Ukraine liberated most of Kharkiv Oblast in September, Kherson City in November, and is currently
setting conditions for more Ukrainian pushes elsewhere this winter.
Successive operations are a key
part of Ukraine’s campaign design. A series of successive Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in
Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts demonstrates the Ukrainian military‘s remarkable operational planning
skill and knowledge of the strengths of Soviet operational art. Soviet operational art emphasizes that
militaries can only obtain their strategic objectives through the cumulative operational success of
successive operations ideally conducted without operational pauses between them.
Recent official
Ukrainian statements make clear that Ukraine’s campaign design is designed to allow a series of
