1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 1
Riley Bailey, Madison Williams, Yekaterina Klepanchuk, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan
December 1, 9:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continued to set informational conditions to resist Russian
pressure to enter the war against Ukraine by claiming that NATO is preparing to attack Belarus. Lukashenko
blamed Ukraine and NATO for a growing number of provocations near the Belarus-Ukrainian border and stated that
Ukraine is trying to drag NATO forces into the war.[1] Lukashenko stated that Belarusian officials managed to deter a
potential adversary from using military force against Belarus and that NATO is building up forces and intensifying combat
training in neighboring countries.[2] The Belarusian Minister of Defense Viktor Khrenin stated that there is no direct
preparation for war and that Belarus will only defend its territory.[3] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate
(GUR) representative Vadym Skibitsky reported that there are no signs of the formation of a strike group on Belarusian
territory.[4] Lukashenko and Khrenin likely made the comments to bolster what ISW has previously assessed as an ongoing
information operation aimed at fixing Ukrainian forces on the border with Belarus in response to the threat of Belarus
entering the war.[5] Lukashenko and Khrenin also likely focused the information operation on supposed NATO aggression
and provocative activities along the Belarusian border to suggest that the Belarusian military needs to remain in Belarus to
defend against potential NATO aggression, and thus set informational conditions for resisting Russian pressure to enter the
war in Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Belarusian entry into the Russian war on Ukraine is extremely unlikely.
Key Takeaways
• Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continued to set informational conditions to
resist Russian pressure to enter the war against Ukraine.
• Russian forces continued efforts to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations
along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued to make incremental gains around Bakhmut and to conduct
offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area.
• Russian forces continued to conduct defensive measures and move personnel on the east bank
of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian military movements in Zaporizhia Oblast may suggest that Russian forces cannot
defend critical areas amidst increasing Ukrainian strikes.
• Russian forces are holding reserves in Crimea to support defensive operations in Zaporizhia
Oblast and on the east bank of the Dnipro River.
• The Kremlin’s financial strain continues to feed domestic unrest.
• Evidence persists regarding the continuation of partial mobilization in the face of low morale
and high desertion rates amongst Russian troops.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin continued attempts to bolster the Wagner
Group’s reputation.
• Russian occupation officials continued efforts to integrate occupied territories into the
Russian financial and legal spheres.
• Russian forces continued to exploit Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure in support
of Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.
