Institute for the Study of War & The Critical
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 3
Riley Bailey, George Barros, Karolina Hird, Nicholas Carl, and
Frederick W. Kagan
December 3, 6 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Ukrainian forces reportedly reached the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River across from
Kherson City. The Ukrainian “Carlson” volunteer special air intelligence unit posted footage on
December 3 of Ukrainian servicemen traversing the Dnipro River in boats, reaching a wooden marina-
like structure on the east bank, and raising a Ukrainian flag on a tower toward near the shore.
1
Special
Unit “Carlson” reported that this is the first instance of a Ukrainian flag flying over the east bank of the
Dnipro River and emphasized this operation will provide a springboard for subsequent Ukrainian
operations on the east bank.
2
If confirmed, this limited Ukrainian incursion onto the east bank could
open avenues for Ukrainian forces to begin to operate on the east bank. As ISW has previously reported,
observed Russian fortifications on the left bank indicate Russian forces are anticipating Ukrainian
offensive actions on the east bank and have been constructing defensive lines south of the Dnipro
River.
3
The establishment of positions along the eastern riverbank will likely set conditions for future
Ukrainian offensive operations into occupied Kherson Oblast, if Ukrainian troops choose to pursue this
line of advance in the south.
French President Emmanuel Macron amplified Russian information operations about
the West’s need to discuss Russian “security guarantees” in a televised interview on
December 3.
4
Macron stated that the West should consider how to address Russian security
guarantees if President Vladimir Putin agrees to negotiations about ending the war in Ukraine: “That
topic will be part of the topics for peace, so we need to prepare what we are ready to do, how we protect
our allies and member states, and how to give guarantees to Russia the day it returns to the negotiating
table.”
5
ISW has extensively documented how the Kremlin demanded “security guarantees” and
declared “lines” as part of the ultimatum it presented the US and NATO before launching the February
2022 invasion.
6
Russia’s demanded security guarantees entail partially dismantling NATO by returning
NATO to its 1997 borders, and grants Russia a veto on future NATO expansion by demanding NATO
suspend its “Open Door” policy.
7
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov referred to these precise
demands on December 1, as ISW previously reported.
8
The Russian demand for supposed “security
guarantees” is part of a larger Russian information operation that portrays NATO as having provoked
the 2022 Russian invasion by threatening Russia. The security guarantees that Ukraine, NATO, and the
rest of Europe would accept from Russia following the Kremlin’s unprovoked and brutal war of
conquest against Ukraine might be a more appropriate topic of conversation for Western leaders
considering negotiations with Moscow.
Independent Russian polling data indicates that Russian citizens still support Russia’s
military operations in Ukraine despite growing war weariness over the past six months.
Independent Russian polling organization Levada Center found that 74 percent of Russians support
Russian forces’ actions in the war in Ukraine in a November poll published on December 2.
9
The poll
found that 42 percent of respondents “strongly support” and 32 percent “somewhat support” Russian
forces’ actions in Ukraine.
10
The poll also found that only 41 percent of respondents favored Russia
