1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 21
Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Layne Philipson, Yekaterina Klepanchuk, Madison Williams,
and Frederick W. Kagan
November 21, 7:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Two days of shelling caused widespread damage to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on
November 20 and 21. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated on November 21 that there are no
immediate nuclear safety and security concerns and that the integrity of all six nuclear reactors and the spent and fresh fuel
storage facilities remain uncompromised despite the intense shelling.[1] Russia and Ukraine both accused the other of
conducting the artillery strikes on the ZNPP on November 20 and 21.[2] One Russian milblogger referenced a video of the
shelling taken by Chechen forces and stated that it appeared the shelling came from positions in Russian-controlled territory
south of the ZNPP, not Ukrainian-controlled territory north of the ZNPP.[3] Russian nuclear operator Rosatom Head Alexey
Likhachev warned of a nuclear disaster at the ZNPP, and Russian milbloggers largely amplified his statements and called
for the transfer of all Ukrainian nuclear power plants to Russian operation.[4] ISW has previously assessed that Russian
forces have staged false flag attacks against the ZNPP and previously reported on Russian forces’ unlawful militarization of
the ZNPP.[5] Artillery strikes themselves are unlikely to penetrate the containment units protecting each nuclear reactor
and instead pose a greater threat to the spent nuclear fuel storage facilities, which could leak radioactive material and cause
a radiological (as opposed to nuclear) disaster if compromised. The continued conflation of radiological and nuclear
accidents and the constant discussion of the threat of disaster at the ZNPP is likely part of a wider Russian information
operation meant to undermine Western support for Ukraine and frame Russian control of the plant as essential to avoid
nuclear catastrophe in order to consolidate further operational and administrative control of Ukrainian nuclear assets and
compel elements of the international community to recognize Russian annexation of Ukrainian territory at least obliquely.
The Russian government is continuing to increase its control of the Russian information space as a
Russian milblogger noted that Russian efforts to shape the information space “look like a kitten against a
rhinoceros” compared with foreign “think tanks,” non-profit organizations, and “independent
media.”[6] Russian news outlet Kommersant reported on November 21 that the Russian State Duma may consider a bill
before the end of 2022 on the regulation of online “recommender” algorithms that would ultimately allow the government
to turn off specific algorithms.[7] The bill is reportedly being developed by Duma Deputy on Information Policy Anton
Gorelkin and will include the regulation of social media networks, online cinemas, search engines, and internet
marketplaces.[8] Kommersant noted that this bill will require the owners of all sites and platforms to ensure the
government’s ability to fully or partially block the participation of specific users and that these provisions appeared before
the beginning of the war in October 2021 to specifically target Western outlets such as Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube
due to the risk of “social conflict.”[9] Certain Russian milbloggers responded to the speculation regarding the bill and noted
that such recommender algorithms make it harder for nations to disperse propaganda due to the prevalence of accessible
and personally tailored information available on the internet.[10]The Duma is likely considering this bill in an attempt to
address a consistent point of neuralgia in the Kremlin’s ability to present and defend the war to domestic audiences and to
establish a direct means of countering both internal and external sources of online dissent.
The Russian Federal State Security Service (FSB) additionally took steps to codify control over the information space and
signed a decree on November 4 that approved a list of military and military-technical activities, which if received by foreign
sources, can be used against the security of the Russian Federation.[11] The decree essentially codifies types of information
relating to Russian military operations that the FSB regards as threats to Russian security that are not technically classified
as official state secrets and includes a broad list of provisions relating to informational coverage of the war such as
“information on the assessment and forecasts of the development of the military-political, strategic (operational) situation,”
and “information about the observance of rule of law and the moral and psychological climate” of Russian troops.[12] This
decree represents an extended effort on the part of the FSB to broadly ban a wide range of information on the Russian
military, which would ostensibly place tighter controls on discourse among Russian milbloggers and other such sources who
frequently discuss and criticize tactical, operational, and strategic dimensions of the war in Ukraine.
Both the proposed Duma bill and the FSB decree indicate that the Russian government is scrambling to take control of the
information space as it is increasingly inundated by criticisms of the Russian military that are levied both internally and
externally. Russian officials likely seek to consolidate censorship measures to crack down on the prevalence of foreign voices
and domestic critiques by applying legislative pressure to fundamental algorithms and presenting a wide range of activities
that can be considered detrimental to Russian state security.
