Institute for the Study of War &
AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 18
Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Madison Williams, Yekaterina Klepanchuk, and
Frederick W. Kagan
November 18, 8:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian officials are preparing for further covert mobilization efforts even as the fall
conscription cycle is underway, likely further flooding the already overburdened
Russian force generation apparatus in such a way that will be detrimental to the
development of mobilized and conscripted servicemen. Russian Telegram channels actively
discussed indicators on November 18 that the Kremlin is preparing for a second mobilization wave and
circulated an image of a draft summons received by a citizen of St. Petersburg who was reportedly told
to appear for mobilization in January 2023 despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement
of the formal end of partial mobilization on October 31.
Nationalist milbloggers additionally circulated
claims that general mobilization will begin in December or January.
An independent Russian outlet
published an investigation on November 18 showing that state structures and enterprises are
continuing to prepare their employees for mobilization by sending them to various training programs
and mobilization-related educational courses.
Another Russian outlet noted that the Odintsovo
garrison military court in Moscow Oblast inadvertently confirmed that mobilization is continuing
despite its formal end.
The court reportedly accused a mobilized soldier of beating his commander on
November 13 “during the performance of his duties of military service or in connection with the
performance of these duties during the period of mobilization,” which indicates that the court is
operating on the legal basis that mobilization is still very much underway.
The Kremlin has said that
Russian President Vladimir Putin has no need to sign a decree formally ending the mobilization period,
as ISW has previously reported.
The continuation of covert mobilization efforts and potential preparations for another mobilization
wave in tandem with the current fall conscription cycle are likely adding substantial strain to an already
over-burdened Russian force generation apparatus. As ISW previously assessed, Putin likely ordered
the end of partial mobilization in order to free up bureaucratic and administrative capacity for the
November 1 conscription class.
However, it is evident that Russian authorities never fully halted
mobilization efforts, which means that a limited number of mobilized recruits are still being forced
through the training system at the same time as conscripts are going through their own training cycle.
This will likely lead to even lower quality training for both mobilized recruits and conscripts as they
compete for insufficient training capacity. Another wave of mobilization in the coming months will only
worsen the situation and likely degrade the overall quality of the Russian troops that will be funneled
to the frontline in Ukraine.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that it does not recognize
the illegal Russian seizure and operation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant
(ZNPP) or the illegal annexation of occupied Ukrainian territory, a sharp escalation in
IAEA rhetoric. The IAEA’s Board of Governors issued a statement on November 17 that called on
Russia to “immediately abandon its baseless claims of ownership of the plant” and to withdraw “military
and other personnel” from the ZNPP due to “grave concerns” over the ZNPP’s integrity.
The IAEA
issued a statement on November 18 that Russian strikes on November 17 partially or completely cut
