1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 14
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Layne Philipson, Angela Howard, Yekaterina Klepanchuk,
Madison Williams, and Frederick W. Kagan
November 14, 8:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) escalated claims of Russian territorial gains in Donetsk Oblast on
November 13 and 14, likely to emphasize that Russian forces are intensifying operations in Donetsk Oblast
following withdrawal from the right bank of Kherson Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces
completed the capture of Mayorsk (20km south of Bakhmut) on November 13 and of Pavlivka (45km southwest of Donetsk
City) on November 14 after several weeks of not making claims of Russian territorial gains.[1] As ISW assessed on November
13, Russian forces will likely recommit troops to Donetsk Oblast after leaving the right bank of Kherson Oblast, which will
likely lead to an intensification of operations around Bakhmut, Donetsk City, and in western Donetsk Oblast.[2] Russian
forces will likely make gains in these areas in the coming days and weeks, but these gains are unlikely to be operationally
significant. The Russian MoD is likely making more concrete territorial claims in order to set information conditions to
frame Russian successes in Donetsk Oblast and detract from discontent regarding losses in Kherson Oblast.
Russian milbloggers seized on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s November 14 visit to Kherson
City to criticize Russian military capacity more substantively than in previous days during the Russian
withdrawal from the right bank of Kherson Oblast. Russian milbloggers largely complained that Zelensky arrived
in Kherson City and was able to move around with relatively little concern about Russian strikes in his vicinity and
questioned why Russian forces did not launch strikes on Zelensky.[3] One prominent milblogger noted that this shows that
Russia does not want to win the war and criticized Russian forces for allowing Zelensky to step foot on “Russian
territory.”[4] Russian milbloggers have notably maintained a relatively muted response to the Russian loss of the right bank
in the past days, as ISW has previously reported.[5] The clear shift in rhetoric from relatively exculpatory language generally
backing the withdrawal as a militarily sound decision to ire directed at Russian military failures suggests that Russian
military leadership will likely be pressured to secure more direct gains in Donetsk Oblast and other areas.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin continues to establish himself as a highly independent,
Stalinist warlord in Russia, becoming a prominent figure within the nationalist pro-war
community. Prigozhin commented on a Russian execution video of a reportedly exchanged Wagner prisoner of war,
Yevgeniy Nuzhin, sarcastically supporting Nuzhin’s execution and denouncing him as a traitor to the Russian
people.[6] Most sources noted that Wagner executed Nuzhin following a prisoner exchange on November 10, but a few
claimed that Wagner kidnapped the serviceman via Prigozhin’s connections to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)
and the Russian General Staff.[7] Prigozhin claimed that Nuzhin planned his escape to free Ukraine and used the
opportunity to compare Nuzhin to Russian elites who disregard the interests of the Russian people and fly away from
Russia‘s problems in their personal business jets.[8] The Russian nationalist community overwhelmingly welcomed the
public punishment of the supposed deserter, noting that the Wagner command is undertaking appropriate military
measures to discipline its forces.[9] Some milbloggers even compared the execution to Joseph Stalin’s “heroic” execution of
Russian Marxist revolutionary Leon Trotsky who had also fled Bolshevik Russia, further confirming Prigozhin’s appeal
among the proponents of Stalin’s repressive legacy.[10] Prigozhin is taking actions that will resonate with a
constituency interested in the ideology of Russia’s national superiority, Soviet brutalist strength, and
distasteful of the Kremlin’s corruption, which Russian President Vladimir Putin has used as a political
force throughout his reign.
Prigozhin is steadily using his participation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine to consolidate his influence
in Russia. One milblogger voiced a concern that the integration of Wagner mercenaries into Russian society is “the
destruction of even the illusion of legality and respect for rights in Putin’s Russian Federation.”[11] The milblogger added
that Prigozhin is seizing the initiative to expand Wagner’s power in St. Petersburg while Russian security forces are “asleep.”
Such opinions are not widespread among Russian nationalists but highlight some concerns with Prigozhin’s rapid expansion
amid the Russian “special military operation” and its implications on the Putin regime. Prigozhin, for example, has
requested that the FSB General Prosecutor’s office investigate St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov for high treason
after St. Petersburg officials denied a construction permit for his Wagner Center in the city.[12] He had also publicly scoffed
at the Russian bureaucracy when asked if his forces will train at Russian training grounds, likely to further assert the
independence of his forces.[13] Prigozhin’s unhinged antics in the political sphere are unprecedented in Putin’s regime.
