Institute for the Study of War &
AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 9
Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Madison Williams, Yekaterina
Klepanchuk, Nicholas Carl, and Mason Clark
November 9, 9:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) ordered Russian forces on the west (right) bank
of the Dnipro River to begin withdrawing to the east (left) bank on November 9. Russian
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu ordered the withdrawal of Russian troops across the Dnipro River
during a highly staged televised meeting with Commander of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine
Army General Sergey Surovikin on November 9. During the televised meeting, Surovikin recommended
the withdrawal and Shoigu accepted his decision, giving Surovikin the task of ensuring the “safe transfer
of personnel, weapons, and equipment” to the east (left) bank.
Shoigu and Surovikin’s statements mark
the beginning of a steady, fighting withdrawal by Russian troops across the Dnipro to prepared
positions on the east (left) bank to preserve the combat power of Russian units, including elements of
the 76th and 106th Airborne Assault Divisions and 22nd Army Corps.
Surovikin notably stated that
half of the troops withdrawn from the west bank of the Dnipro will be redeployed to other areas of
Ukraine. The entire Russian contingent will take some time to withdraw across the Dnipro River and it
is still unclear if Russian forces will be able to conduct the withdrawal in relatively good order under
Ukrainian pressure. The battle of Kherson is not over, but Russian forces have entered a
new phase—prioritizing withdrawing their forces across the river in good order and
delaying Ukrainian forces, rather than seeking to halt the Ukrainian counteroffensive
entirely.
The Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Kherson direction since August—a coordinated
interdiction campaign to force Russian forces to withdraw across the Dnipro without
necessitating major Ukrainian ground offensives—has likely succeeded. As ISW has
observed over the previous months, Ukrainian forces engaged in a purposeful and well-executed
campaign to target Russian concentration areas, military assets, and logistics nodes throughout
Kherson Oblast to make continued Russian positions on the west bank untenable without having to
conduct large-scale and costly ground maneuvers to liberate territory.
Ukrainian troops launched
constant attacks on bridges across the Dnipro River and targeted supply centers and ammunition
depots on the east bank of the Dnipro that degraded the ability of Russian forces to supply the grouping
on the west bank; Ukrainian forces combined these strikes with prudent and successful ground attacks
on key locations such as Davydiv Brid. This campaign has come to fruition. Surovikin directly
acknowledged that Russian forces cannot supply their grouping in Kherson City and the surrounding
areas due to Ukrainian strikes on critical Russian supply lines to the west bank.
Russian sources noted
that the withdrawal is a natural consequence of targeted and systematic Ukrainian strikes that cost the
Russian grouping on the west bank its major supply arteries, which gradually attritted their overall
strength and capabilities.
The Russian withdrawal from the west bank of the Dnipro is unlikely to be a trap meant
to lure Ukrainian troops into costly combat near Kherson City, as some Ukrainian and
Western sources have suggested.
ISW has previously observed many indicators that Russian
