2022. The Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Kateryna Stepanenko and Mason Clark
November 6, 7:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map
is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, November 6. This report
discusses the recent reduction of nuclear threats by key Kremlin figures and the
likely role of Russia’s military leadership and the international community in
prompting this change, and the risks of further Russian nuclear saber rattling.
Key Kremlin officials began collectively deescalating their rhetoric regarding the
use of nuclear weapons in early November. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
released a statement on “the prevention of nuclear war” on November 2, stating that Russia “is
strictly and consistently guided by the postulate of the inadmissibility of a nuclear war in which
there can be no winners, and which must never be unleashed.” The Russian MFA also stated that
it is committed to the reduction and limitation of nuclear weapons.
Russian President Vladimir
Putin stated on October 27 that Russia has no need to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine and
claimed Russia has never discussed the possibility of using nuclear weapons, only “hinting at the
statements made by leaders of Western countries.”
The deputy chairman of the Russian Security
Council, Dmitry Medvedev, has similarly increasingly downplayed the fiery nuclear rhetoric he
used throughout October and is now focusing on promoting Russian unity in the war in Ukraine.
Putin and key Kremlin officials had increased their references to the use of nuclear
weapons from Putin’s September 30 annexation speech and throughout October,
likely to pressure Ukraine into negotiations and to reduce Western support for Kyiv.
Putin made several general references to nuclear weapons in his September 30 speech but avoided
directly threatening the use of nuclear weapons.
Putin’s rhetoric during this speech and
throughout October was consistent with his previous nuclear threats and failed to generate the
degree of fear within the Ukrainian government that the Kremlin likely intended.
Ukrainian Main
Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Chief Kyrylo Budanov stated on October 24 that the
Russian nuclear threat has remained at the same level even prior to the start of the war.
The
Kremlin also escalated its nuclear rhetoric after Russian military failures in Kharkiv Oblast and
during Ukrainian counteroffensives in Lyman and northern Kherson Oblast in early October. The
Kremlin likely continued its thinly veiled nuclear threats to deflect from their military and
mobilization problems and to intimidate Ukraine’s Western partners.
The Kremlin’s rhetorical shift indicates that senior Russian military commanders
and elements of the Kremlin are likely to some extent aware of the massive costs for
little operational gain Russia would incur for the use of nuclear weapons against
Ukraine or NATO. The New York Times, citing senior US officials, reported that senior Russian
defense officials discussed the conditions for nuclear use against the backdrop of growing nuclear
narratives in mid-October.
The meeting reportedly did not involve Putin. Putin’s illegal
September 30 annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts, much of whichRussian forces do not occupy,
likely overcomplicated existing Russian military doctrine. Russian nuclear doctrine clearly allows
for nuclear weapons use in response to “aggression against the Russian Federation with the use
of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy,” which the Kremlin
could conceivably apply to Ukrainian advances into claimed ”Russian” territory in Ukraine.
All
of the current frontlines fall within claimed Russian territory, andPutin has not publicly defined
what now constitutes an attack on Russian territory. It is possible that senior Russian military
