Institute for the Study of War &
AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 4
Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Madison Williams, Yekaterina Klepanchuk, and
Frederick W. Kagan
November 4, 9:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Russian military is likely trying to use mobilized personnel to restart the Donetsk
offensive but will likely still fail to achieve operationally significant gains. Commander-in-
Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Valerii Zaluzhnyi reported on November 4 that Russian
forces have tripled the intensity of hostilities in certain sections of the front with up to 80 daily assaults.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are currently focusing those offensive
operations in the direction of Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and western Donetsk Oblast.
The Ukrainian Eastern
Group of troops spokesperson Serhiy Cherevatyi stated on November 4 that Russian forces are likely
trying to seize Bakhmut and Soledar in Donetsk Oblast so that Russia can declare some type of success
by announcing the “liberation” of the Donbas (even though those gains would not give Russia control
over the entire region).
Cherevatyi also noted the presence of mobilized men in the Bakhmut direction,
an area that should not in principle see many mobilized personnel given the extensive presence in this
area of Wagner Group and proxy units that should not be receiving large numbers of Russian
reservists.
ISW previously assessed that Russian forces prematurely impaled an insufficient
concentration of mobilized personnel on offensive pushes near Bakhmut and Vuhledar in Donetsk
Oblast on November 3.
The apparent intensification of Russian assaults in Donetsk Oblast likely
indicates that Russian forces are repeating that mistake throughout this section of the front. The
increased quantity of personnel at frontline positions may allow Russian forces to achieve some gains
in Donetsk Oblast, but poor training, logistics, and command will continue to prevent Russian forces
from making operationally significant gains that would materially affect the course or outcome of the
war.
Russian forces are setting conditions for a controlled withdrawal in northwestern
Kherson Oblast, likely to avoid a disorderly rout from the right (west) bank of the Dnipro
River. Russian forces will likely need to engage in a fighting withdrawal to prevent Ukrainian forces
from chasing them onto the left (eastern) bank. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command corrected
social media reports from November 3 regarding the destruction of civilian boats and piers along the
Dnipro River.
Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Russian forces are purposefully
destroying civilian vessels and are restricting civilian use of watercraft and access to the shore. The
corrected story likely corresponds with the reports of Russian forces preparing defensive positions on
the left bank and the withdrawal of certain elements and suggests that Russian forces are eliminating
ways for Ukrainian forces to chase them across the river during or after a withdrawal. Local Ukrainian
sources also shared geolocated footage that reportedly showed the aftermath of the recent Russian
destruction of a pedestrian bridge over the Inhulets River in Snihurivka (about 60km east of Mykolaiv
City), which may also indicate Russian efforts to slow Ukrainian advances amidst a Russian
withdrawal.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is likely setting conditions to continue covert
mobilization, which suggests that partial mobilization did not generate sufficient forces
