1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 3
Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Yekaterina Klepanchuk, and Frederick W. Kagan
November 3, 9:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian forces are continuing to withdraw some elements from northwestern Kherson Oblast, but it is still
unclear if Russian forces will fight for Kherson City. Kherson City occupation deputy Kirill Stremousov stated on
November 3 that Russian forces “will most likely leave for the left (eastern) bank” of the Dnipro River urging civilians to
evacuate from Kherson City “as quickly as possible.”[1] ISW has observed that Russian forces are continuing to prepare
fallback positions on the left (eastern) bank of the Dnipro River while continuing to set up defensive positions northwest of
Kherson City and transporting additional mobilized forces there, despite Stremousov’s statement.[2] Some Russian elite
units — such as airborne forces and naval infantry — are reportedly continuing to operate on the right (western) bank of the
Dnipro River and their full withdrawal from northern Kherson Oblast would be a clearer indicator that Russian forces will
not fight for Kherson City or settlements on the right bank.[3] Stremousov also hypothesized about the probability of
fighting in Kherson City and northern Kherson Oblast in the next two weeks, which may suggest that he anticipates some
battles for Kherson City despite his comments about withdrawal.[4] Stremousov is also an unreliable source who has
consistently issued contradictory statements and made emotional responses to events, and his public statements may be
clouded by personal fears of losing his position within the occupation government.
Ukrainian and Russian sources also extensively discussed the reported closure of some Russian checkpoints in the vicinity
of Kherson City, the theft of city’s monuments, and the removal of a Russian flag from the Kherson Oblast Administration
building as indicators of an ongoing Russian withdrawal from the city.[5] A Russian outlet claimed that Russian officials
removed the flag because the occupation administration moved to Henichesk by the Crimean border.[6] While the
relocation of the Kherson Oblast occupation government may suggest that Russian forces are preparing to abandon Kherson
City, it may equally indicate that they are setting conditions for urban combat within the city. Similar reports may arise in
coming days given the ongoing forced evacuation of civilians from both right and left banks of the Dnipro River but may not
indicate an immediate withdrawal of Russian forces from Kherson City. The disposition of Russian airborne forces remains
the best indicator of Russian intentions.
Russian forces prematurely impaled an insufficient concentration of mobilized personnel on offensive
pushes near Bakhmut and Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast, wasting the fresh supply of mobilized personnel on
marginal gains towards operationally insignificant settlements. Ukrainian General Staff Deputy Chief Oleksiy
Hromov stated on November 3 that one or two Russian motorized rifle companies with artillery and tank support conducted
ground attacks within the past week to seize Pavlivka in an effort to reach Vuhledar, but that Russian forces have suffered
losses due to Ukrainian defenses.[7] Russian sources also acknowledged on November 3 that the rate of Russian advances
near Vuhledar is slow due to Ukrainian resistance and mud.[8] Hromov stated that Russian forces continue ground attacks
at the expense of mobilized personnel, private military company forces, and former prisoners, and that the Russians
conducted over 40 ground attacks in the Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and western Donetsk Oblast areas in the past 24 hours,
sustaining over 300 casualties (100 killed) in just one direction.[9] ISW has previously reported on the slow Russian rate of
advance in Donetsk Oblast and injudicious allocation of resources on the front lines.[10] Russian forces would likely have
had more success in such offensive operations if they had waited until enough mobilized personnel had arrived to amass a
force large enough to overcome Ukrainian defenses despite poor weather conditions. Russian attacks continuing current
patterns are unlikely to generate enough momentum to regain the battlefield initiative. ISW offers no hypothesis to explain
Russian forces’ impatience or their continued allocation of limited military assets to gaining operationally insignificant
ground in Donetsk Oblast rather than defending against the Ukrainian counteroffensives in Luhansk and Kherson oblasts.
Russian outlets continued to publish confused reports regarding the dismissal and replacement of Colonel
General Alexander Lapin from either his role as the commander of the Central Military District (CMD) or
as the commander of the Russian “central” forces in Ukraine. The CMD press service told Kremlin-affiliated
outlet Kommersant that the head of the organizational and mobilization department of the CMD, Major General Alexander
Linkov, will temporarily replace Lapin as the CMD commander.[11] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has not
officially announced Lapin’s dismissal or replacement, and the CMD did not specify if Linkov will also take charge of the
“central” forces in Ukraine. Unnamed Russian MoD sources had previously told other Kremlin-affiliated outlets that
Commander of the 8th Combined Arms Army of the Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant-General Andrey
Mordvichev would command “central” forces while Lapin is on a three-week medical leave.[12] Milbloggers with ties to the
Russian state media also recently claimed that Mordvichev will also command the CMD.[13] Such incoherent
announcements by Russian MoD officials about the possible replacement of the second most-senior Russian commander in
Ukraine is highly unusual for a professional military during a critical period of a war.
