1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 24
Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, Grace Mappes, Angela Howard, and Fredrick W.
Kagan
October 24, 8:30 PM ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Kremlin intensified its information operation to accuse Ukraine of preparing to
conduct a false-flag attack using a dirty bomb for a second day in a row on October
24. Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov separately called his counterparts from the
United Kingdom and United States about the “situation connected with Ukraine’s possible use of a dirty
bomb” (a conventional explosive laced with radioactive material that is not a nuclear weapon) on October
24.[1] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu made similar calls with his counterparts from the United
Stated, United Kingdom, France, and Turkey on October 23.[2] The Chief of Russia’s Radiation, Chemical,
and Biological Protection Forces, Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov, gave a lengthy briefing accusing Ukraine of
planning a dirty bomb false-flag provocation to accuse Russia of detonating a low-yield nuclear weapon in
Ukraine on October 24.[3] Russian military bloggers are amplifying this information operation.[4] ISW
assesses the Kremlin is unlikely to be preparing an imminent false-flag dirty bomb attack.[5]
Russian forces conducted air, missile, and drone strikes against targets in Ukraine at a
markedly slower tempo than in previous days. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October
24 that Russian forces conducted 2 missile and 28 air strikes, and Ukrainian forces shot down 16 Shahed-
136 drones on October 23.[6] The slower tempo of Russian air, missile, and drone strikes possibly reflects
decreasing missile and drone stockpiles and the strikes’ limited effectiveness of accomplishing Russian
strategic military goals.
Ukraine’s Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Chief, Major General Kyrylo Budanov, stated on
October 24 that the impact of Russian terrorist strikes against critical Ukrainian infrastructure is waning
as Russian forces further deplete their limited arsenal of cruise missiles.[7] Budanov stated that Russian
forces have stopped targeting Ukraine’s military infrastructure, instead aiming for civilian infrastructure
to incite panic and fear in Ukrainians. Budanov noted, however, that Russian forces will fail as Ukrainians
are better adapted to strategic bombing than at the beginning of the war. Budanov claimed that Russian
forces have used most of their cruise missile arsenal and only have 13 percent of their pre-war Iskander,
43 percent of Kaliber, and 45 percent of Kh-101 and Kh-555 pre-war stockpiles left, supporting ISW’s
prior reports on dwindling Russian precision-guided munition stockpiles.[8] Budanov noted that Russian
cruise missiles lack precision, as a missile likely intended to hit the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU)
building in Kyiv missed its target by 800 meters. Budanov stated that Russia’s dwindling supply of cruise
missiles is forcing the Russian military to rely on Iranian drones but that Iranian suppliers only send 300
drones per shipment and that the drones take a long time to manufacture. Budanov stated that Ukrainian
air defenses shoot down 70 percent of all Shahed-136 drones, including 222 of the 330 Russia has used so
far. It is impossible to assess the degree to which ongoing unrest and growing strikes in Iran might
interfere with Tehran’s ability to manufacture and ship drones to Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts on September 30
ignited a schism within the Kremlin, which will likely intensify as Ukraine liberates more
territories, according to Budanov. Budanov stated that Kremlin elites largely did not support Putin’s
decision to annex Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk Oblasts prior to securing those territories,
prompting many officials to contact their Western counterparts to express their disinterest in continuing
the war in Ukraine.[9] Budanov claimed that some Kremlin officials began advocating for negotiations
with Ukraine to their Western counterparts while the Russian military-political command plotted missile
strikes to scare Ukrainians into negotiations. Budanov‘s statement is consistent with the influx of Western
reports about direct criticism of Putin within the Kremlin less than a week after the annexation
announcement around October 6.[10] Wagner Group–affiliated Telegram channels also noted the
emergence of the pro-war and pro-negotiations factions within the Kremlin within the same
