Institute for the Study of War &
AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 26
George Barros, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 26, 7:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
A Reuters investigation of a document trove found in an abandoned Russian command
post in Balakliya, Kharkiv Oblast, supports ISW’s longstanding assessments about the
poor condition of Russian forces. ISW has long assessed that the conventional Russian military
in Ukraine is severely degraded and has largely lost offensive capabilities since the summer of 2022,
that Russian strategic commanders have been micromanaging operational commanders' decisions on
tactical matters, and that Russian morale is very low. Reuters’ investigation found that Russian units
near Balakliya were severely understrength, with a combat battalion at 19.6-percent strength and a
reserve unit at 23-percent strength.
The investigation found that poor morale, bad logistics, and
overbearing commanders contributed to Russian forces’ poor performance.
The report found that the
Russian Western Military District explicitly forbade a subordinate from withdrawing from an untenable
position in the small village of Hrakove (which has an area of less than three square kilometers).
Ukrainian forces defeated Russian forces in Balakiya and routed Russian forces in eastern Kharkiv
Oblast around September 8-10.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric indicates that he is not interested in
negotiating seriously with Ukraine and retains maximalist objectives for the war. Putin
stated that Ukraine has “lost sovereignty” in a meeting with Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) security officials on October 26.
Putin stated that the United States is using Ukraine as a
“battering ram” against Russia, the Russian-Belarusian Union State, the Collective Security Treaty
Organization, and the CIS. Russian State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin amplified this narrative,
stating that “Ukraine has lost the ability to exist as a state,” “Ukraine is occupied by NATO,” and
“[Ukraine] has become a colony of the US” on October 26.
This language is incompatible with
negotiations on an equal basis for a ceasefire, let alone a resolution to the conflict that Russia began. It
instead strongly suggests that the Kremlin still seeks a military victory in Ukraine and regime change
in Kyiv that would affect the permanent reorientation of Ukraine away from the West and into Russia’s
control. It also indicates that Putin’s aims transcend the territory he has claimed to have annexed, let
alone the areas his forces actually control.
Russian occupation officials in Kherson Oblast are attempting to mitigate the
informational consequences of the chaos of the initial Russian withdrawals from the
west bank of the Dnipro River. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated on October
26 that it would be “practically impossible” to completely destroy the dam at the Kakhovka
hydroelectric power plant (HPP) and that even the destruction of the dam locks at the HPP would only
cause the water level of the Dnipro River to rise less than 2 meters.
Saldo’s statement directly
contradicts his own prior statements and the warnings made by Commander of Russian Armed Forces
in Ukraine Army General Sergey Surovikin on October 18 that Ukraine is planning to strike the
Kakhovka HPP and cause flood damage along the Dnipro River.
Saldo’s apparent retraction of his own
warnings may suggest that he seeks to quell anxiety accompanying the mass movement of civilians and
Russian military and occupation elements across the Dnipro in order to preserve his own ability to rule.
Saldo also issued assurances about the provision of basic utilities and financial services that he claimed