1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’S Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment,
October 16
Special Edition on Key Terrain in the Russian Invasion of
Ukraine
Frederick W. Kagan
October 16, 4:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map
is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
This campaign assessment special edition focuses on the specific parts of
Ukrainian territory currently under Russian occupation that are important for the
long-term viability of an independent Ukraine. Ukrainian forces are currently
conducting a counteroffensive push in Kherson Oblast as of October 16. We will
update our maps after information about the new front lines unambiguously
enters the open-source environment.
Ukraine must regain certain specific areas currently under Russian occupation to
ensure its long-term security and economic viability. Ukraine’s ability to defend itself
against a future Russian attack requires liberating most of Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts.
Ukraine’s economic health requires liberating the rest of Zaporhizia Oblast and much of
Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, including at least some territory Russia seized in 2014. Ukraine’s
security would be materially enhanced by liberating Crimea, which would also benefit NATO’s
ability to secure its southeastern flank.
Ukraine has every right to fight to liberate all the territory Russia has illegally
seized, particularly in light of the continued atrocities and ethnic cleansing Russia
is perpetrating in the areas it occupies. Kyiv’s insistence on regaining control of Ukrainian
territory to the internationally-recognized borders is not an absolutist or extremist demand—it
is the normal position of a state defending itself against an unprovoked attack as part of a war of
conquest. It is also the default position of the international community under international law,
as it should be. Nothing in the following discussion should be construed as supporting any
attempt to encourage, let alone coerce, Ukraine to abandon either its claims or its efforts to free
all its land and people.
However, Ukraine also requires the liberation of the areas mentioned above for
purely strategic military and economic reasons. ISW continues to assess that Putin’s
intentions toward Ukraine are unlikely to change whether or not a ceasefire or some other
settlement occurs. The Kremlin would use any suspension of hostilities to consolidate its gains
and freeze the frontline in the best configuration Putin can get to prepare for future coercion
and aggression against Ukraine. Those seeking enduring peace in Ukraine must resist the
temptation to freeze the lines of combat short of Ukraine’s international borders in ways that set
conditions for renewed conflict on Russia’s terms. The purpose of this brief essay is to consider
why specific parts of Ukrainian territory still under Russian occupation are so important for the
